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A. Background
The use of barriers  to  international trade  is  virtually as old as  trade
itself and,  in particular, conflicts between domestic regulations and
international trade are not new to  the  food sector.  In the  wave of
protectionist tariffs  that spread across  Europe  in the  late 1800's,  livestock
products were protected less  than grains.  However, another practice began to
appear.  "Apparently, most countries  used veterinary and sanitary restrictions
to ban livestock imports from particular countries until  the day when frozen
meat made  this  instrument less  effective  (Heidhues, 1979, p. 119)."  In  the
U.S.,  regulations concerning health, safety,  and product  quality were well
established by the 1930's  (Hillman, 1991,  p. 20).
With  the liberalization of  international  trade,  it has become
increasingly difficult for countries  to maintain policies that overtly protect
specific  sectors.  Consequently, some countries have turned  to non-tariff
barriers  to  trade.  Over  the past several years,  there have been a number of
well-publicized charges  that certain domestic environmental, health, or  safety
(EHS)  regulations are,  in fact, disguised trade barriers.  While concern over
EHS/trade conflicts by  trading sectors has been growing, so has the  demand for
consumer, worker and environmental protection  (Association for Consumer
Research, 1990).1  Thus,  the direction of alleged causality also  runs the
1The EC,  for example, has  introduced detailed consumer protection
legislation covering production, processing and marketing of agricultural
products  and foodstuffs.  At the  production stage,  legislation addresses the
marketing and use  of plant protection products  (pesticides);  the  establishment
of maximum levels of pesticide  residues  in cereals,  fruits  and vegetables,  and
foodstuffs  of animal origin;  animal  feed additives and microbial
contamination;  veterinary medicinal products such  as hormones  and antibiotics;
1other way;  some consumer and environmental organizations view multilateral
trade  liberalization as  a threat to  local and global environmental  quality,
food safety, and human health.
While  progress has been made  toward trade liberalization,  the  food
sector has tended to  lag behind other sectors  in the establishment of
international rules for  resolving or preventing trade disputes  that arise  from
domestic regulations.  Food sector EHS/trade disputes have proven challenging,
partly because they pose relatively intractable political problems  in which
different  domestic constituencies  are pitted against  one another.  Food sector
EHS policies  are highly salient and politically charged because  food and land
resource quality often have implications for national sovereignty, cultural
identity or have long-standing symbolic or social values  (preservation of
family farmers  or rural  landscapes, food self-sufficiency, low/stable prices
for basic  foodstuffs).
Such disputes are challenging also because of  the  analytical difficulty
in estimating the economic effects  of an EHS regulation, justifying some
countermeasure,  and predicting improved outcomes  from alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms.  There  is  insufficient  information about the manner  in
which regulations are applied, the degree to which they impede  trade, and the
magnitude of protection they afford various agricultural commodities  (Hillman,
and radioactive contamination of agricultural products.  With  respect to
processing and marketing stages,  the  EC has legislation addressing additives
to  improve durability, texture,  stability, color,  aroma, and taste;  treatment
processes, specifically quick-freezing and irradiation (Smeets, 1990).  In
addition, the Common Agricultural  Policy (CAP) contains provisions
discouraging large  industrial  type units  in egg, poultry, and pig production
by restricting aids  to  such units.  Also, CAP provides  for annual  allowances
to  farmers  to  offset higher production costs in  "less  favored agricultural
areas"  and aids to  protecting the environment and countryside.  Finally, the
CAP provides  funds  for agricultural research on environmental protection and
forestry measures  (Godin, 1987).
2p.5 3).
These analytic challenges are  compounded by competing perspectives by
which to measure positive or negative economic effects of  an EHS regulation.
Judgements  about whether an EHS  regulation warrants some countermeasure  are
made, albeit often implicitly, in the context of a particular  analytic
perspective.  As  discussed  in Section IV, a regulation's  trade effects must be
analytically and politically distinguished  from its  social welfare  effects.
Trade effects  are  typically measured by changes  in sectoral  output, exports,
or employment or overall  trade balance or terms of trade.  Welfare effects, in
contrast, are measured by changes  in net social benefits  (benefits minus
costs),  without regard to  their distribution.
EHS/trade disputes  in the  food sector are expected to become  increasing
visible with the unification of  the  European Community, which may generate
strong incentives  to  create  common regulations  for  internal purposes  and to
impose restrictions on the rest  of the world.  A similar propensity may occur
as  a result of the U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement  (Runge, 1990b).
B. Organization of Paper
In  this paper, we seek to  clarify several policy questions  that have
discussions EHS/trade disputes:
What are  the principal  rationales for government  intervention in the
areas  of environment, health, and safety and why have  these
justifications become obscured in  the food  sector?
How do  different underlying analytical perspectives used by disputants
in EHS/trade conflicts  tend  to polarize the  issues?
What are  the pathways by which domestic EHS regulations may affect
international  trade?
What are  the pathways by which  liberalized international trade may
affect environmental  and food quality and human health and safety?
3What insights  into EHS/trade  disputes are provided by theoretical and
empirical results  from trade/environment models?
What  are the advantages  and disadvantages of unilaterally and
multilaterally applied tests  and standards of  trade impacts?
What institutional mechanisms have been proposed for avoiding and/or
resolving EHS/trade disputes?
Section II  provides some examples  of EHS/trade  disputes and existing
institutions mechanisms  to  resolve them.  Sections III  through IX of  the paper
are organized and ordered according to  above questions.  Finally, section X
offers  a summary of policy issues,  and a prognosis  for EHS/trade conflicts  and
some policy recommendations.
4II.  The Policy Problem
To help motivate this paper, we review a few examples  of EHS/trade
disputes that have disparate trade and welfare  implications.  We then examine
existing institutional mechanisms with attention to  their shortcomings  for
resolving such disputes.
A. Examples of Recent EHS/Trade Disputes
The first  example  is  food irradiation.  As international trade  in food
products increases,  irradiation has been viewed as  a solution to  concerns  over
food-borne diseases  and spoilage  losses as well as  to  costly regulations
related to quality and quarantine.  The  industry position is  that  irradiation
is  safe and that uniform national  irradiation regulations and promotion of
consumer acceptance will facilitate  the use  of this technology.  Furthermore,
irradiated food products have already been test-marketed in several countries,
with consumers preferring irradiated products to  their non-irradiated
counterparts in several side-by-side comparisons  (Loaharanu, 1989).
While the benefits  of irradiation with respect to pathogens  are well-
established, substantial consumer opposition to the process has been manifest
in Europe, notably in the European Parliament, Denmark and Germany.  Opponents
argue that irradiation may adversely affect food quality;  it may be used to
preserve  the appearance of food the nutritional value  of which has decreased;
and labeling is unreliable.  Opponents also  fear  that consumers will
inadvertently purchase poorly or nonlabeled food products.  The  industry view
is  that  "political heavyweights"  are  "making use  of often ill-informed public
opinion and prejudice  (Eurofood, 1989a, 1989b)."  Nonetheless, opposition was
sufficiently strong for the  EC Commission to  reduce  the number of product
5groups  for which irradiation is  approved  (Eurofood, 1989c).  Since  irradiation
has been primarily proposed for imported tropical foodstuffs, such a ban
cannot be accused of giving European producers an unfair advantage but  is  a
barrier to market access.
This dispute emphasizes  the tension between consumer sovereignty and
scientific expertise.  According  to a scientific perspective, for a country to
unilaterally ban imports  of irradiated food would constitute  a trade barrier.
In contrast,  if prevailing  consumer preferences were negative,  such a ban
would constitute a legitimate domestic policy, albeit heavy-handed, to  address
a source of market  failure  (lack of consumers'  ability to  differentiate food
products).
The second example  of an EHS/trade dispute arises  out of subnational
legislation directed at domestic production practices.  Specifically, several
U.S. municipalities and states have proposed legislation requiring newspaper
publishers to  use partly recycled pulp  in newsprint.  American legislators
maintain that such measures, intended to  conserve  landfill space  and reduce
resource consumption, represent a "legitimate domestic  objective."  Canadian
pulp and paper companies,  however, suspect that  the measures constitute a non-
tariff barrier to  trade because  insufficient supply and higher costs  of used
newspaper collection in Canada would tend to  favor U.S.  industries.  The
matter may be  taken before a dispute settlement panel established through the
U.S/Canada Free  Trade Agreement  (St. Pierre,  1990, p. 4).
Our third example, a bill proposed in the  101st U.S.  Congress  called the
Global  Environmental Protection and Trade Equity Act,  is  directed at foreign
rather than domestic production practices.  Its  ostensible goals are  to
protect  international environmental quality and level the  international trade
6playing field.  To protect U.S.  industry from "unfair"  competition with
countries having less  stringent environmental standards,  the bill would allow
the U.S.  Trade Representative  to pursue  "unreasonable" trade practice  cases,
under Section 301 of the U.S.  Trade Act, if a competing country fails  to  enact
effective environmental protection legislation.  The  bill also prohibits  the
President from granting favorable  tariff treatment to  a country under the
Generalized System of Preferences or  Caribbean Basin Initiative unless  it
enacts  and enforces  environmental protection controls.  The  determination of
compliance with this provision is  to be made by advisory groups with
representation from government, business, and environmental organizations.
The President may waive this  requirement for national security or economic
reasons  (Congressional Record, 1990, p. S-5486).  Since the bill received
support from the Sierra Club, National Wildlife Federation and the United
Steelworkers of America, questions may be raised by other countries  about its
intent.
While this particular bill died in committee, others  of its  type are
likely to  be proposed and have the  potential to generate  EHS/trade disputes
even  if other countries  are not required to have EHS  standards  identical  to
those prevailing in  the  U.S..  This bill's  sponsors note that it  is modeled
after U.S.  international worker's rights  standards which have not been
successfully challenged under GATT provisions  to  date  (Congressional Record,
1990, p. S-5489).
B. Existing  Institutional Mechanisms  to Resolve EHS/Trade Disputes
There are several established avenues for aggrieved parties  to pursue to
resolve EHS/trade disputes:  intergovernmental  litigation, supranational
7regulation, unilateral  retaliation.  Here, we  discuss  only a few of the more
prominent examples.
The earliest and  still primary institutional mechanism based on
multilateralism  is contained in the  GATT language  establishing rules of
international trade.  The  GATT articles,  adopted by the contracting parties  in
1947,  explicitly recognize the possibility that domestic health, safety and
environmental policies might override general attempts  to  lower trade barriers
(Jackson, 1969).  GATT article XI, headed "General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions,"  states  in paragraph (1):
No prohibitions or  restrictions other than duties, taxes  or other
changes, whether made effective  through quotas,  import or export
licenses or  other measures,  shall be instituted or maintained by
any contracting party on the  importation of any product of  the
territory of any contracting party or on the exportation or  sale
for  export of any product destined for  the territory of any other
contracting party.
Yet Article XX, headed "General Exceptions,"  provides
...nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to prevent  the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
...(g) relating to the conservation of  exhaustible natural
resources  if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions  on domestic production or consumption;
provided that such measures:
... are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same  conditions prevail,  or a disguised restriction on
international  trade.
A similar  set of exceptions was applied to health related measures under
Article XX  (b).  GATT law emphasizes  that any restrictions imposed on  foreign
practices  for environmental or health  reasons must also reflect a domestic
commitment,  so that  the exception cannot be misused as  a disguised form of
protection  (Runge, 1990b).
8Following a detailed analysis  of these early provisions  of GATT relating
to environmental protection, Kirgis concludes:
In  the  absence of effective coordination, GATT provides  some rules
and procedures that will have  to be used to  try to  find a balance
among liberal trade policies, national full-employment objectives,
and pollution control imperatives.  But  the  outlook is  cloudy at
best if GATT has  to go  it  alone  in its present  form (Kirgis,  1972,
p. 917).
The Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations produced a Code of Conduct for
Preventing Technical Barriers  to  Trade  (also known as  the Standards  Code).
The Standards  Code covers  all types  of product standards,  including technical,
health, safety, consumer protection, and environmental standards.  The
obligations of the Standards  Code are easy  to  state but difficult to  apply:
product standards,  tests and test methods,  and systems  for certifying
conformity with standards  are not  to create  "unnecessary obstacles  to
international trade."  Nor are they to  be used  "with a view to  creating
obstacles  to  international trade."  Signatory governments are  to  accord
treatment, with respect to product standards,  to  imports no less  favorable
than that accorded domestic products.  Other provisions require  open
procedures  in the adoption of product standards,  fairness  in the application
of test methods  to  foreign products, and procedures for settling  international
trade disputes.  The problem of subnationally promulgated standards  is handled
by requiring central governments  to use  "such reasonable means which may be
available  to  them" to  see  that states,  local governments, and private studies
adhered to  the  requirements of the  Code  (Rubin, 1982,  pp.  8-10).
Under the Standards  Code, an exporting party must prove that  the
importing party has  imposed a regulation for protectionist reasons  or  that the
measure  is  "unduly burdensome"  or  "unnecessary."  These  terms,  however, are
not further defined (Rothberg, 1990, p. 111).
9The Standards Code  establishes several phases of  dispute resolution.
The first phase calls  for prompt bilateral  consultations by the disputants.
The second phase calls  for the convening of the  GATT Committee on Technical
Barriers to  Trade to  investigate the matter.  Where the dispute concerns
questions of a technical nature,  the  Code requires  a third phase that entails
formation of a Technical Expert Group  to  examine scientific judgement on  the
issue.
The  dispute settlement process  set out  in this  agreement failed to
resolve a dispute between two signatories,  the U.S.  and EC,  regarding the  EC's
ban on meat treated with growth hormones  (Dick, 1989).  In  the hormone  issue,
the dispute resolution process displayed its  flaws  in its  third phase.
Formation of a Technical Expert Group  is  stated to be an act of the Committee
which acts only in consensus.  Since the  EC objected to  forming the Group,  its
objection was  fatal.  It  is  unlikely that such a consensus can ever be reached
as  long as the disputants themselves are  allowed to vote on the Committee.
The jurisdictional  nature of the  EC's  objection to  the formation of  the
expert group exposes a second flaw of the  Standards Code.  According to  the
EC,  the ban was a requirement in terms  of a "process and production method
(PPM)," while the Standards  Code only governs requirements  in terms of product
characteristics.  The Code's  drafters expressly excluded PPMs because PPMs
were  intensively used  in the agricultural sector and signatories did not want
this highly sensitive area  to be subject to  the Standards  Code.  There  is
provision, however,  for a party to claim that the obligation under  the
agreement  is  being purposely circumvented by the  language used in  the
requirements  (Dick).
In  addition to  the  Standards  Code,  the  Tokyo Round of GATT also produced
10a Code on Subsidies  and Countervailing Duties which recognizes both that
domestic subsidies may have harmful effects on trade and that such subsidies
are used by governments to  promote important  objectives of national policy.
The rules  concentrate on the effects  of subsidy practices,  rather than on the
acknowledged sovereign right of governments  to  subsidize,  and permit
governments whose  industries are  adversely affected by others'  subsidies  to
take offsetting action  in the  form of countervailing or penalty duties  imposed
against imports.  While the analogy between subsidies  and environmental
controls is  imperfect since controls  are the obverse  of subsidies,  the Code
may offer a conceptual model  for accommodating national sovereignty  in trade
rules  (Rubin).
Three organizations have been identified in GATT negotiations  for
providing international scientific  expertise:  the Codex Alimentarius  (CODEX)
for food safety, International Plant  Protection Convention  (IPPC)  for plant
health, and the  International Office of Epizootics  (OIE) for animal health.
(There are  several other  international organizations that could serve to
harmonize food and other standards  (Vettorazi, 1989),  leading one  author to
call for  international mechanisms  that will  "harmonize the harmonizers"
(Gerard, p. 289)).  Critics have charged that at best, the Codex Commission
receives advice from expert committees whose members  come from a limited
number of countries  and do not usually represent the  full range  of expert
opinion and perspectives  (Association for Consumer Research) and,  at worst,
CODEX is  "stocked with industry handmaidens" (Wysham, 1990, p. 771).  In a
recent U.S.  delegation  of 28  individuals, 12  represented multinational
corporations  such as Coca-Cola and Nestle  (Wysham).  Thus,  there  is  some
public perception of lack  of scientific objectivity on at least one  of these
11international panels.
In  summary, existing multilateral  institutions for resolving EHS/trade
disputes  appear  ill-equipped to  resolve disputes  arising out  of the magnitude
and varieties  of current world trade.  Their language regarding what
constitutes a trade barrier  is  sometimes vague or  inconsistent and practical
application of legal terms  is  difficult.  Procedures are  often cumbersome and
can be  stymied by disputants  themselves.  The  role of international scientific
organizations  is unclear and their objectivity has been questioned.
12III.  Market Failure as Rationale for EHS Regulations
A. Causes of Market  Failure
Government intervention in the  food sector has been justified on the
basis  of correction of market failure or for a variety of nonefficiency-
related national objectives such as  price stabilization, self-sufficiency or
income redistribution.  Market failure exists when market prices  do not
reflect real resource  costs  to  society or when markets  do not exist for  a good
or service.  Since  a given EHS regulation may address both market failure and
nonefficiency related social goals  (as with the U.S.  Conservation Reserve
Program and European land retirement programs2), it may be difficult to
classify a given EHS regulation in terms of its  dominant national  objective.
Two extreme perspectives can be differentiated regarding government
intervention in private markets  (Rausser).  One  is  that governments  intervene
to  correct market failures, a rationale that  lends  legitimacy to  domestic EHS
regulations.  The other  is  that governments  intervene  to  redistribute wealth
to politically potent  interest groups, resulting in  "government failure",
which lends  itself to  an interpretation of EHS regulations  as  instruments  of
protectionism.
Because market failure  is  the most common  (if sometimes  implicit)
justification for EHS  regulations, we summarize  its major sources  in the  food
sector.  EHS regulations  in the  food sector are  similar to  regulations
directed at other sectors  in  terms  of the sources of market failure  they are
2The  Conservation Reserve  Program and some  European programs are  intended to  reduce temporal  and spatial externalities associated with soil  erosion, redistribute income  to  participating  landowners, and reduce  agricultural
production, thus  reducing government budget exposure  from commodity price stabilization programs.
13ostensibly designed to  redress--externalities, information asymmetry, open
access  resources divergence between social and private discount rates and
market power.
Agricultural production activities  sometimes result in spatial or
intertemporal environmental externalities.  An example of a spatial
externality is nonpoint  source water pollution that adversely affects off-farm
water resources.  Some spatial externalities are  transnational, such as
flooding in Bangladesh being exacerbated by erosive farming practices in
Nepal.  An example  of an intertemporal externality  is  soil loss  contributing
to  future crop productivity loss  that may or may not occur within the tenure
of  the landowner whose practices are  causing the erosion.
Lack of information at the point of production  is another source  of
market failure.  Farm operators often lack information about the adverse
environmental  effects of production practices.  Farm workers may lack
information about health and safety risks of machinery and agrichemicals.
Asymmetric  information at  the point of consumption may also cause market
failure.  Unlike manufactured goods,  unprocessed  (and some processed)
foodstuffs  do not have brand names  from which information about content and
production practices can be  inferred.  Food has attributes  of what  is  called a
"credence  good",  that is,  certain qualitative attributes cannot be readily
determined even after consumption (Senauer, 1991).  While  food testing and
product labeling are used to reduce this  lack of  information at the point of
consumption,  food inspection resources are spread thin.  Furthermore,
standards violations  tend  to be higher for  imports  than for domestically
produced commodities  (Senauer, 1989).
Information asymmetry in the  food sector is  exacerbated because  of the
14multitude of individual production decisions  that can not be adequately
monitored directly without prohibitive cost.  Consequently, environmental
policy instruments in agriculture rely on sampling procedures  for monitoring
and enforcement or on incentive-compatible  (preference-revealing) policy
instruments  at the point of production.
Private time horizons,  discount rates,  and property rights  assignments
may give  rise  to private  incentives with respect  to  agricultural production
practices  that diverge  from  those  associated with social optimality.  For
example,  land tenure  relations may be such that  landowners and farm operators
have nonconvergent  incentives with respect  to  soil conservation investments.
Factor inputs in production may also be relatively immobile.  For
example, in some  regions, farm workers  are subject  to monopsonistic hiring
conditions.
B. Legitimacy of Market Failure Rationale from International Perspective
While the above examples suggest  that market  failure is  a necessary
condition for the legitimacy of a domestic EHS  regulation, one country's
market failure may be  another's  government failure.  First, countries  use a
wide variety of policy instruments  that affect non-efficiency social
objectives  to varying  degrees.  The policy instruments used to  achieve
environmental, health, and safety objectives  include  technical standards,
restrictions on the use of  inputs,  output quality standards, positive  or
negative economic  incentives,  export restrictions, embargoes,  outright bans,
labeling requirements,  disposal standards,  etc.  Some  EHS regulations allow
substitution of production technology to meet an EHS objective, while others
do not.  Also, EHS  regulations may intervene at different points along the
15production process, such as  controlling inputs, production technology,
characteristics  of outputs,  treatment of environmental externalities,  and
storage and shipment of  commodities.  While  it may be possible to  achieve  the
same environmental quality goal at  any of  these points, resulting  trade
effects may vary widely.
A second reason is  that, unlike the industrial sector, prevailing
property rights assignments  in most countries  tend to  give landowners the
right to manage  farm production practices as  they wish, even if such practices
generate environmental externalities.  Policy instruments for  land management
thus  tend to  focus on positive incentives,  such as  subsidies,  to  change
producer behavior in ways  that reduce the  externality.  While  the initial
assignment of property rights may be  considered irrelevant from a simple
Coasian perspective, welfare  outcomes are sensitive  to prohibitively high
transactions costs  and to  power differentials between polluters  and pollutees
(Livingston).  Furthermore, property rights are shifting away from landowners
in some countries  (exemplified by Conservation Compliance provisions  of the
U.S.  1985 farm bill3); consequently, policy instruments to  achieve
agricultural resource  goals may use positive incentives  in some countries and
negative  incentives  in others.
Another reason for lack of  international agreement over what constitutes
market failure is  heterogeneity among nations  on both supply and demand side
factors.  Consider two countries  that have both historically regulated a
particular form of pollution but have marginally differing pollution emission
standards.  For  some level of emissions between the  two standards,  the  initial
3Under Conservation Compliance provisions, farmers must develop approved
farm conservation plan or risk  loss  of government program benefits.
16assignment of property rights  lies with the pollutors in one  country and the
pollutees  in the other.  In the  country with the more  stringent standard, the
right to enjoy a level of environmental quality above the  level of the
standard lies with the pollutees.  In the more  lenient country, inducing a
reduction in pollution would require  the use  of positive  incentives
(subsidies), while in the other case,  the  same reduction could be achieved
through regulation or  taxation.  From the perspective of one country, the
subsidy is  a clear case of government failure  if  it  does not recognize  that
standards may differ due to  supply or demand side endowments.
Theorists have defined at least four determinants of relative
environmental factor endowment:
1) the natural assimilative capacity of the land, water, and atmosphere, as determined by such factors as  climate, rainfall, wind patterns,  and geographical location;
2) the value  that citizens place on environmental quality, that may be transmitted via government regulations;
3) the current demands on the natural assimilative capacity of the environment, reflected by levels  of industrialization and urbanization and pollution levels;  and
4) the amount of public and private investment undertaken to either  increase
the natural assimilative capacity or  decrease the  demands placed on it (Leonard,  pp.  59-60).
Of these determinants of relative  environmental endowment within a country,
only the  first is  fixed;  the  rest may evolve over time in response to  changing
preferences and tastes and rates  of industrialization and urbanization,
mobilization of environmental constituencies,  institutional changes,  and
income  changes.
On the demand side, countries have different  tastes and preferences  for
environmental  quality, food safety, and human health.  The Japanese, for
example, are much more wary of artificial food additives,  than natural  food
17additives,  even if their chemical constituencies are  identical  (Vogel, 1989).
The distinction between supply and demand side endowment heterogeneity
is  relevant  to EHS/trade disputes  since efforts  to harmonize  regulations
(discussed in Section IX)  are likely to  be more intense  if national
differences  are perceived to  result from cultural rather  than physical
endowments.
18IV. Alternative Analytical  Perspectives for Evaluating EHS/Trade Disputes
Debate over trade barrier effects  of EHS and other administrative
regulations  typically focuses on deviations from a condition  of free  trade.
When all markets operate perfectly  and are undistorted by government
intervention, free  trade between two  countries  is  theoretically a "first best"
policy for the countries  considered jointly.  The  two countries are better off
with trade  than under autarky, in terms of social welfare, though
distributional  effects may require compensation  (rarely carried out)  to
certain sectors within each country.  This  fundamental result underlies  the
push for  freer trade, even though the assumptions it requires  (perfectly
functioning, complete, undistorted domestic markets) are  invariably violated.
Because those  "first best"  conditions generally do not prevail, how an EHS
regulation affects  trade must be distinguished from its welfare  effects.
Most models  in the literature  that integrate  EHS regulations and trade
focus on changes  in net social welfare.  Yet virtually all public debate
focuses on the competitiveness  of specific producing  sectors.  Reasons for
this may  include relative visibility, relative  ease of measurement (partial
versus  general equilibrium),  and distributional effects on well organized
producing sectors.
It may be helpful  to make explicit  some of  the analytical choices  that
underlie  the debate about EHS/trade disputes  and remedies.4 Consequently,
this  section outlines  three analytical dimensions underlying the  development
of trade  impact  criteria:
4The  importance of being explicit about such choices  is  apparent from an
exchange over semantics and accounting perspective in  the American Journal of
Agricultural Economics  regarding whether gains  from trade necessarily occur
when government distortions exist  (Schmitz et al.,  1990).
191) What  are the boundaries of the economic system to  be  analyzed--the specific
sector(s)  directly affected by the regulation, the entire  economy of the
affected country, or  the economy of the global  trading system?
2) Are changes  in private market values and/or  social  (including nonmarket)
values being considered?
3) What states of the world are being compared;  in particular, what is  the
base case  against which other observed or hypothetical cases  are compared?
A. Boundaries of Economic System Affected by EHS Regulation
With respect to  the  first question, the most parochial choice  is  to
limit  the boundaries  of an EHS/trade analysis  to  directly affected commodities
or  sectors.  The  results of this  type of analysis are  typically in terms  of
changes  in sectoral  output, exports,  or employment.  Because  of distributional
effects  of an EHS  regulation, political pressure to  conduct  this  type of
partial analysis  is  more intense than the other  two choices.
Expanding boundaries  to analyze  general equilibrium effects of an EHS
regulation refocuses  the  policy question from distributional  to efficiency
effects.  This  type of analysis measures  changes  in terms of national trade
balance, employment and economic growth and  is more difficult to  conduct than
sectoral analysis.
The  distinction between these  two analytical perspectives  sometimes
becomes blurred in analyzing EHS regulations and the  economy-wide effects of
actions  to  remedy them.  Overall  impacts  of changes  in EHS regulations cannot
be assessed without  looking beyond  the specific  commodities affected.  This  is
because of an identity in national  accounts, namely, the  trade balance equals
the difference between national saving and national  investment.5 A
5The macroeconomic  identity  is  as  follows:
X - M = S + (T - G) - I
That  is,  the trade balance of exports  less  imports  (X - M) equals  the
20relaxation of an EHS regulation, for example,  that has  the effect of
increasing U.S.  food exports  to Japan may not have any effect on the overall
U.S.  trade balance.  Movements  in saving and investment translate into overall
trade surpluses  or deficits  through  linkages  that may not track with the
effects of specific EHS  or other domestic policies  on particular sectors.
"Only insofar  as actions influence  saving and investment can they influence
the trade balance  (Cooper, 1988,  p. 116)."  Furthermore, government subsidies
to  enhance the competitiveness  of specific  sectors might actually worsen the
overall trade balance, if investment is  stimulated and the budget deficit is
increased  (Cooper, p. 118).
The third analytical boundary, that of the global economy, would be
applied when the policy questions  address efficiency effects  at the
international  level.  As  such,  results that apply this perspective  are
unlikely to be considered in EHS/trade disputes  unless  there  is possibility of
side payments  among nations.  Otherwise, even if a given resolution  to  a
dispute results  in greater global welfare than some  other resolution  that
results  in positive but small welfare gains to both countries,  the global
Pareto preferred solution is  unlikely to  gain adherents.  This  is not to  say
that  countries would not prefer multilateral  to  unilateral approaches to
EHS/trade disputes  on the basis of national economic effects.  GATT law does
provide  for compensation for enacting trade barriers under some  conditions
(Jackson, 1969),  a provision that can be interpreted as allowing side
payments.
difference between national savings  and national investment  (I),  where
national saving equals private-sector saving  (S)  plus  taxes  minus government
expenditures  (T - G).
21B. Social or Private Accounting Perspective
With respect  to  the second analytical choice (between private or social
benefits and costs),  two  EHS regulations  that have  identical effects under one
framework may have very different effects under the other.  What is
categorized as  a benefit  or cost may differ  as well as  their respective
valuations.  Under a social accounting framework, all  inputs  and outputs  are
valued at  their real opportunity costs  to  society,  including nonmarket goods
such as  environmental amenities and food quality attributes not recognized in
market transactions.  Government payments are considered transfers and do not
directly enter the calculation.  Using a private accounting framework,
government payments  to  producers are counted, but environmental amenities may
be  excluded.
The choice between social and private values also determines how
benefits and costs  are quantified.  When a good is  purchased from one country
rather than another, there  is a net gain to  the producing  country only if the
price of the good exceeds  the  social opportunity costs of the resources
engaged in production of the good.  In the food sector, market values may
diverge  from social opportunity costs because of multiple government
interventions, many of which are designed to  fulfill social goals  other than
market failure.  Even if market failure were  the  goal  of all  interventions,
second best considerations may prevent market values  from accurately
representing social values.
Environmental and consumer groups  focus  on the social welfare effects  of
EHS regulations  and trade.  Accordingly, as  countries  systematically establish
and enforce environmental standards,  some alteration of international  trade
and investment is  likely and desirable  from an efficiency perspective
22(Pearson, 1987).
C. States of the World Being Compared
The  third analytic choice may also have strong implications for policy
results.  The assumed base case  state of the  world may be one with or without
other government distortions and one with autarky or  free trade.  Since only
one state of  the world is  actually observed, the other state(s)  must
necessarily be simulated, holding  some set of separable  conditions constant.
Such simulations must make  explicit assumptions  regarding the presence  or
absence of other government policies, partial or general equilibrium
frameworks, incorporation of dynamic as  well as  static relationships,  etc.
According to Walter, (1975),  from a purely theoretical perspective,
trade  is not distorted when trade flows  according to  the  comparative advantage
of different  trading partners.  Prices  should reflect  the  true productive
capacities  of the  country--the full social costs  involved in production
activities.  Since  the definition of trade distortion refers to a hypothetical
situation of unrestricted competition, it  is  impossible to define with
certainty such a condition  in order  to  compare an actual distorted situation
with a previous undistorted one.  With regard to  the environment, countries
are  starting with a distorted situation, since market prices  do not reflect
true  social costs.  Because implementation  of environmental policies  implies
internalization of external costs,  changes of trade patterns will inevitably
result.
23V.  Linkages from Domestic EHS regulations to International Trade
A.  General Linkages
In this section, we  discuss how the  trade effects  of EHS regulations are
different than and similar  to  those of other domestic regulations.  EHS  food
sector regulations affect trade in several ways that are analogous  to  trade
effects  from other domestic policies that may act as non-tariff administrative
trade barriers.
The principle  linkages from environmental regulations  (health and safety
regulations have  similar linkages)  to  international trade  are summarized by
Walter  (1975)  :
1)  Short-term competitive effects:  Environmental control  raises production
costs  and this affects  the competitiveness of domestic  export and import
competing  industries.  Productive factors become reallocated  in a country's
economy.
2) Balance of trade effects:  By altering the  terms of trade, environmental
control costs  can influence the balance of  trade.  If export- and import-
competing goods become more expensive,  then the balance of trade can be
expected to worsen if imports  or exports  are relatively sensitive to  the price
changes induced by pollution control.
3) Comparative advantage effects:  By  influencing the cost of producing
different products in different ways,  environmental management will also have
an impact on the structure of trade, that  is,  on its  direction and commodity
composition.  When a previously unpriced immobile resource becomes priced, its
price will be reflected in international  comparative advantage.
4) Factor movement effects:  If an  industry is  threatened with competitive
24dislocations,  it may choose  to  shift the  location of production facilities, or
at least  incremental productive capacity, to  sites characterized by greater
environmental  assimilative capacity, different environmental preferences, or
both.  This  is probably less  of an  issue with respect to  agriculture than
manufacturing, due to  factor immobility  in land and labor.
5) International economic policy effects:  Increases in production costs  and
losses  in  international competitive position attributable to environmental
measures may  trigger charges of unfair competition.  International differences
in the  instruments of pollution control will  tend to  raise the probability of
commercial policy reactions.
Demand factors have a direct bearing on international trade and resource
allocation in three ways.  First, a systematic  effort  to  improve  the
environment may depress real  income  spendable  on conventional goods and
services below what would otherwise be  obtained.  This  reduces  the overall
volume  of trade.  Second, each internationally traded good has  a unique
environmental profile, that  is,  the environmental costs  associated with its
manufacture, use,  and disposal.  If these are internalized, their relative
size will be highly product specific.  Substitution  in consumption and
production inputs will be reflected in  international trade  in affected
products.  Third, environmental control requirements may give rise  to
development of a wide variety of goods and services that  are internationally
traded  (Walter, 1975).
According to Walter  (1975),  shifts in the pattern of trade  flows  from
environmental  regulations are  relatively large under  the following conditions:
1) large  relevant differences  in environmental assimilative capacity  for the
specific effluents  involved;
2) large inter-country variations  in social preferences  for environmental
25quality;
3) wide  inter-country differences  in approaches  to  environmental restoration
and maintenance;
4) few barriers are applied to  trade  and capital  flows;  and
5) high substitution and price sensitivity of  the  traded products affected
(pp.  53).
B. Linkages Specific to Major Categories  of EHS Regulations
While EHS  regulations appear  to  result in some general  trade effects,
they also have  some fundamental differences that are relevant to  analytical
results  relating to social welfare effects,  the  design of  tests of  trade
impact, and international institutional reforms.  Several  categories of EHS
regulations can be differentiated.
The  first  category is  comprised of  regulations  intended to  correct  some
domestic source of market failure at  the point of production within a country.
Examples are financial  assistance for erosion control, government-supported R&D in
cost-reducing or output-enhancing technologies and subsidized infrastructure  for
agricultural production in the form of irrigation, produce transportation, and
rural electrification.  Such policies may result  in a rightward shift in the
industry's domestic supply function.  The shift  in domestic  supply curves results
in a shift in the excess supply curve determining the amount of the good that will
be  exported to  the  rest of the world (Sutton, 1989).  Negative policy instruments
may also be used that  result in domestic and excess supply shifting  in the
opposite direction.  Examples  of such policies  are environmental protection
regulations, farmworker health and safety standards,  and animal welfare standards.
One of the most common types  of EHS/trade  disputes  is  when exports  are
hampered because  of product regulations  in the  importing country.  This  is what
26occurred  in the beef hormone dispute between the U.S. and the  E.C..  Thus,  the
second category of EHS  regulations are  those designed to  correct market failure
occurring at  the point of consumption.  Here,  an importing country promulgates an
EHS  regulation that requires  standards  for certain qualitative attributes of  food
products  consumed domestically, regardless  of whether  they are produced
domestically or  imported.  Examples  include standards regarding chemical  residues
(pesticides, synthetic hormones and antibiotics, coloring agents, etc.),
biological contaminants  (pathogens, insects),  irradiation, and quality
differentiation  (based on location of origin, ingredients, processing techniques).
A subcategory  is when an importing country's regulation has  the effect of raising
transactions costs  associated with  international trade,  rather than production
costs.  Examples  are plant or animal product quarantines at  the importer's
national border and packaging/labeling requirements.
The  imposition of EHS  standards on final goods  can put foreign suppliers  at
a disadvantage  in at least two ways.  First,  if the export market  is only a small
proportion of the output of  a firm (or of an optimally sized plant),  the
adaptation of a domestic  good to higher foreign standards can impose diseconomies
of small scale production.  Standards that  increase production costs may affect
all products sold in a given market  (whether imported or produced domestically),
so there may not be any discriminatory  intent aimed at foreign suppliers.  Export
suppliers, however, may have to  service multiple markets subject  to  a range of
environmental  controls,  so that scale economies  are  sacrificed in comparison with
import-competing suppliers  in these markets  (Walter, 1975).
On the demand side,  the cost and quality changes brought about by the
standards may induce buyers to  adopt domestic products  if they are  less costly to
bring up  to  standard.  The basis  for setting and measuring standards  may also
27differ among nations.  The design needed to  serve a foreign market may be
substantially different from that  required in the home market.  Under these
conditions, few  firms will  invest in the product design needed for exporting, thus
curtailing volume of  international  trade  (Walter, 1976).
A  third category of EHS regulations  are those enacted by one country to
address market  failure within another country at  the point of production.  There
are  several pathways for a market failure  in one country to  adversely affect  the
welfare  of citizens  of another country.  Production practices may cause
transboundary pollution (in which  the other country is  directly affected) or  the
citizens  of  the other country may have non-use value for some environmental
resource that  is being reduced by the  offending production practices.  Examples  of
the  latter are boycotts of fish products  from countries  in violation of
international whaling restrictions and bans  on imports  of products  from endangered
species  (whales, elephants)  and endangered ecosystems  (tropical hardwoods, beef
grown in tropical  rainforests).  In a many country world, unless trade  in the  good
in question between the  two countries dominates  trade with other countries,
unilateral regulation  tends  to  affect trade  flows but not market  failure because
of the opportunity for arbitrage  (See Section VII).
A fourth regulatory category is when producer  inputs  or consumer goods
banned in one country are  exported to  another.  Either country may take regulatory
action to  restrict this  trade.  The market failure  that justifies  such actions  is
that  importers  or final users of the good often do not have adequate  information
on the  good's hazards and how they can be mitigated.  The  inefficiency of
unilateral bans  is partly a result of the ability of multinational  corporations
producing the banned product to  shift production to  another country.
The  "circle of poison" concept  is  an example  in which  imported food products
28with pesticide  residues not allowed as  production  inputs in a country are banned.
The  initial domestic pesticide restriction corresponds  to  an EHS  regulation aimed
at domestic market  failure, while the ban on pesticide-tainted imports  could be
interpreted as aimed at foreign market failure.  Unlike transnational  regulations
for which there are no domestically produced counterparts, however,  the  circle  of
poison ban is  subject to accusations of protectionism.
A fifth category is  when both countries pollute a global resource.
Corrective policies  are likely  to  impose  different costs  on producers  in the  two
countries.  While food  sector examples exist  (Methane, a greenhouse  gas,  is
produced from cattle  and  rice paddies),  they are not as  significant as  those
emanating  from the  industrial sector.
29V.  Linkages from Liberalized Trade to Environmental and Food Quality
and Human Health and Safety
A.  Concerns Regarding Static Trade-offs  Between Trade and Environmental Quality
Most of this paper focuses on the effects of  EHS regulations on trade.  The
liberalization of international trade policy, however,  also has  the potential for
affecting environmental and food quality.  As  with the effects  of EHS regulations
on trade,  these effects can be  analyzed using alternative accounting frameworks.
While producer groups  tend to use  a private sectoral perspective  in decrying the
effects of  EHS regulations on trade,  environmental and consumer groups  tend to
focus on the global,  social costs of freer  trade  to  the exclusion of  its  consumer
benefits  (such as  greater product variety and lower costs).
The most obvious  linkage  from trade  to  environmental quality is  the
potential for weakening legitimate EHS  regulations  (that is,  those  designed
primarily to  correct market  failure) to promote  freer  trade.  This  linkage results
from the ability of producers to  externalize those  social costs of production that
are not also private costs.  Increased competition among producing countries with
heterogenous resource and environmental endowments  exerts pressure on producers in
relatively low productivity  regions to  use production practices with relatively
high external costs  of production.
...countries may not know or act on their  true comparative advantage.
Unlike capital  and labor, most environmental services do not pass
through markets and hence,  there are not explicit market prices  to
indicate abundance or scarcity.  Implicit prices  are established by
government regulation, but the process  is  imperfect at best.  Hence,
governments may deliberately or  inadvertently undervalue environmental
services  so  as  to  gain a comparative advantage  in world markets.  The
danger of undervaluing environmental services  is  compounded when
damages  are cumulative,  indirect and long term  (Pearson, 1987,  p.
118).
Where EHS  regulations already apply, freer trade may induce producing
30sectors  or commodity groups  to  lobby for  their relaxation.  The range of EHS
regulations  that could be potentially weakened as a direct or  indirect  result of
trade  liberalization  is  as broad as  that outlined in  section V.  In a worst case
scenario, standards  for pesticides  residues are  relaxed6, international standards
governing  the marketing of products  such as  infant  formula are overturned,  local
antitoxics and recycling  initiatives become pre-empted7 , local moratoria on
controversial production practices  (such as  use of bovine somatotropin) are
lifted, and bans on raw log exports  are deemed protectionist  (Schaeffer, 1990;
Ritchie, 1990;  Wysham, 1990).
Some  of these concerns  appear overstated.  For example, while  several of the
Codex's standards  for pesticide residues are  less stringent  than those of EPA or
FDA  (Ritchie;  Wysham),  Codex itself can not preempt national standards.  In other
cases,  the federal  government already has  some pre-emption authority over local
initiatives  (Conden, 1990).  Nonetheless, many states and localities have filled
what  they perceive  to be  a regulatory void at the federal  level;  pressure for
federal pre-emption exerted by trading sectors can reasonably be expected.
The potential  for federal EHS regulations  to be relaxed depends  in part on
administrative interpretation of existing statutory language.  The main principles
of the GATT Standards Code are  contained in Title  IV of  the U.S. Trade Agreements
Implementation Act  of 1979.  Federal agencies  that develop new product standards
are required  to  take into account existing international standards  and to base new
60pponents  to  a California proposal  that restricts pesticide residues more strictly than federal standards have  argued that  it violates U.S. international  trade obligations  (Burket, 1990, p.4-5).
7There  have been many documented cases of pesticides,  pharmaceutical,  and other products manufactured, but not allowed for sale,  in the U.S.  or Europe having adverse health effects  in  countries where  they are marketed  (Norris, 1982).
31standards  on existing ones if appropriate.  However,  international standards may
not be deemed appropriate as  a basis for new U.S.  standards because  of concern for
"the protection of human health or  safety, animal or plant life  or health or  the
environment."  The  opening section of the Trade Agreements Act states  that.
No standards-related activity of any private person, Federal agency,
or  State agency shall be deemed to  constitute an unnecessary obstacle
to  foreign commerce  of the United States  if  the  demonstrable purpose
of  the standards-related activity is  to  achieve a legitimate domestic
objective  including, but not limited to,  the protection of legitimate
health or  safety, essential  security, environmental or consumer
interests and if such activity does not operate  to  exclude  imported
products which fully meet the  objectives of the activity  (Rubin, p.
14).
This  language would appear  to  insulate  some domestic  EHS regulations from charges
of unfair  trade practices.
B. Linkages Resulting from Technological Change, Scale Economics and Other Dynamic
Relationships
Some linkages  from liberalized trade rules  to  environmental and food quality
are not apparent from a purely static analysis:
1) the potential  for market expansion induces  changes  in production and shipping
technologies  that may affect environmental and product quality;
2) the potential  for market expansion affords opportunities for private scale
economies that may have social scale diseconomies.
The  first  linkage arises out  of the interaction between trade  liberalization
reforms  and technological  innovation.  While a technical  innovation may be  induced
as result of domestic market expansion, it may also be  applied internationally
when trade  is  liberalized.  This  is especially true  if the country where the
technology originates has  long shipping distances.
The food sector  is  distinctive in that, unlike most other traded goods,  food
is perishable.  This attribute results  in a direct linkage between trade
liberalization and those  technological innovations  that enable  food commodities  to
32be  shipped longer distances  and maintain longer shelf lives.
In Japan and many developing countries,  there is  a tradition of food
products  traveling only short  distances  in time and space from producer to
consumer  (Vogel, 1989).  In Europe  and especially the U.S.,  such traditions have
been largely supplanted by food distribution systems  in which commodities  travel
thousands of miles from producer to  consumer.  While  these systems have been
facilitated in part by transportation infrastructure, necessary components also
include production, storage,  and preservation  technologies:  early harvest of
fruits and vegetables with ethylene  dibromide and/or pesticide  applications during
transshipment, breeding of produce  less susceptible to physical damage from
shipping, preservation additives, nonrefridgerated dairy packaging, and
irradiation.
Several of  these technological innovations, however, are perceived by some
consumers to be detrimental to  food or  environmental quality.  Consumers  seek
visual cues  as  to  the  freshness and wholesomeness of a food product since  they
often do not have access  to  information as  to where the  food was produced  or date
of harvest, let alone nutrient  levels.  Production and post-harvest  technologies,
however, are  increasingly able  to mask or delay visual signs  of spoilage  even
though loss of nutritional value has occurred.
A second linkage  arises because trade liberalization may encourage domestic
firms  to forge  cross-border agreements to  reap private economies  of scale  and
scope resulting  in increased market concentration.  Economic
unification/integration affords opportunities for scale economies accruing  to
multinational agribusiness corporations.  There may be  social  diseconomies of
scale, however, if larger production units  result  in EHS externalities.  For
example, beef processing in large feedlots may increase nutrient runoff compared
33to small  operations and requires use  of high energy feed rations controlled by
hormones.  Another diseconomy of scale may result from food products being shipped
longer distances  over longer time periods because food products become more
subject to  loss of nutritional value.  Otherwise, measures  are required to prevent
such loss which are perceived by some consumers  to  adversely affect food quality
(preservatives, pesticides,  irradiation, "hard tomatoes",  etc.).  Finally,
increasing the  scale of agricultural production may diminish the  sense of
community  in rural areas  (Morris, 1988).
There  is  also a causal linkage from freer trade  to  environmental
externalities through production uncertainty.  A fundamental effect of  freer trade
is productivity gain generated through specialization in the mix of commodities
produced on a farm.  Given production and price uncertainty, specialization
represents a change in the mix of risky activities.  Changing from multiple
varieties  and crops  to monoculture caused by trade-induced specialization may
bring higher risks  of crop failure from weather variability and pest  infestations
(Antle and Howitt, 1988,  p. 86-7).  The  federal government, in turn, has
implemented crop  insurance and other policies that insulate  farmers from
production and price risk.  Commodity specialization tends  to have higher
environmental costs  than diversification because of increased application of
pesticides and commercial fertilizers and increased soil erosion.
While there  are many current examples  of the potential interaction among
technological change,  trade, and food quality concerns,  such interaction has a
long history:
...By the end of the 1800's,  the scientific community had
recognized the importance of  reducing disease-causing
bacteria in milk...But some consumer  groups argued that
pasteurization would adulterate  an already safe, wholesome
product and would allow milk producers to  abandon existing
sanitary practices.  Owners of  smaller scale milk plants
34supported this position partly because  the new technology
endangered  their financial  solvency by providing a cost
advantage to their larger competitors.  Owners of the big
dairy plants favored pasteurization because  the technology
gave milk greater shelf life and opened up more distant
markets  (Kuchler et al.,  1989).
This  early debate foreshadowed the  current concerns about the non-neutral  scale
effects of technological change  in the agricultural sector.  While a technology
such as  irradiation may by  itself be  scale neutral,  it may open up  larger markets
or  otherwise complement other production inputs that are not scale neutral.  In
addition, the pasteurization debate  is  similar  to  the BST debate  in that consumer
health concerns have become entwined with producer concerns over the scale  and
distributional  implications of the  technology.
Food packaging offers  another example  of the conflict between trade,
technology and environmental protection.  Food, and especially beverage packaging
trends have been toward lighter, disposable materials  that reduce costs  for long
distance, one way shipment of containers.  Denmark has required all beer and soft
drink containers to be  sold in returnable containers since  1981.  While  this
measure was found by the European Court to  serve a legitimate environmental
objective,  it could incidentally impose higher costs on importers  than domestic
producers.  It was thus deemed a trade barrier by the Court which concluded that,
in achieving a balance between trade and environmental protection, high standards
of protection may have to be reduced  (Shrybman, 1990, p. 25-26).
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Environmental  controls have  typically been incorporated into production
models either by assigning pollution as  a joint output in the sector's  production
process or  treating the  environment as  a factor of production.  Environmental
pollution may also be modeled as  a pure public bad.
For many theoretical trade models, the  starting point is  the Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem:  A country will export goods whose production depends upon high  inputs  of
factors  that are  abundant in  the country and will  import goods produced with
factors  that are  scarce  in the country  (Leonard,  p. 59).  In a two country, two
factor,  two good world, trade  is explained by the differences in pre-trade
opportunity  costs across  the  two countries.  No  trade occurs when two countries
have  identical tastes and factor endowment ratios,  since neither would exhibit a
comparative cost advantage.  These  results derive  from the interaction between
production and consumption sides of the  economy, given fixed factor endowments and
a general equilibrium context.
Since the  1970s,  a body of literature has developed that seeks  to  integrate
or reconcile environmental factors with classical models  of international trade.
In such models, a country richly endowed with environmental inputs  in production
will  generally produce and export those goods whose production is  environmentally-
intensive.  When other factors are  identical across  countries, comparative
advantage can be  defined in terms  of  environmental abundance or scarcity.
In  this  section, we apply some results  from the literature  to  the previously
identified categories of  the more salient  forms  of EHS/trade disputes  to  gain some
policy insights.
36A. Models Addressing Pollution Generated by and Affecting the Environment Within a Trading Country
According to  a model by Blarel  (1985),  free  trade may result  in a multitude
of global Pareto Optimal  solutions with different welfare  distributions among
trading nations.  If a country's environmentally-damaging sector is  import-
competing, an environmental laissez-faire policy  improves the  terms of trade;  if
the  sector  is export competing, the  policy deteriorates  the terms of trade.
In Blarel's  model,  it  is  not possible to  determine  the  trade effects  of an
environmental policy once  output prices are allowed to  adjust;  the effects of
allowing  environmental degradation on the trade and specialization patterns  of a
large  trading country are  indeterminate.  A large country that allows
environmental degradation  to be  associated with one  of  its outputs  through  some
factor of production depresses  the  world price  of that output and reduces  foreign
production incentives.
When two countries exchange  commodities  that are both associated with
externalities, a laissez-faire policy will distort  trade patterns,  forcing each
country to  overspecialize  in the  environmentally-damaging commodity.  The market
outcome reduces  the level of goods  (both private and public)  that could otherwise
be produced in a nondistorted situation and decreases  the  level of welfare
attainable  in each country.  Under some  circumstances, trade reversal may occur.
According  to  another model with two  countries  trading  two goods,  one of
whose production generates pollution, when the pollution intensiveness of the
traded goods varies  across countries,  increased trade may not result in welfare
gains or  gains may be  accentuated  (Pethig, 1976).  If the international amounts of
production of the  two goods  is  fixed, only  the  location of production changes, so
that pollution can be  indirectly imported or exported.  If the pollution-intensive
commodity  is  exported by country A, increased trade could lower A's welfare.  The
37country that  exports  the pollution intensive good may not gain from trade, while
the other country always  gains.  Pollution abatement goals provide an incentive
for one country to  expand trade and for the other  country to  restrict trade.
However,  if the  same  good is  equally pollution intensive  in both countries,  the
assumed fixed worldwide  output ratio between the  two  goods prevents both  countries
from simultaneously  tightening their environmental controls.
In another model of pollution in an open economy  (Asako, 1979),  there  is
two-way causality.  First, pollution controls affect the pattern of trade  through
the induced reallocation of resources and changes  in the structure of prices in
the domestic economy.  Second, the  existence of  international trade implies  that a
country is  taking advantage  of an opportunity that it  cannot otherwise enjoy by
biasing the domestic  economic structure  toward an area in which  it has a
comparative advantage.  The bias has a significant effect on environmental
pollution in the domestic economy.  If a country  first enters  the world market by
exporting a pollution-intensive commodity in return for a less intensive
commodity, the welfare level of that country is  found to  decrease as  a result of a
small  departure from autarky.
According to  a model by Batabyal  (1990),  an environmental regulation's
effect on social welfare can be decomposed into  three constituent components:  a
production effect, a trade effect, and an  environmental quality effect.  The
production effect  is unambiguously negative, the  environmental quality effect is
unambiguously positive  (assuming that an improvement  in environmental quality
increases utility),  and  the  trade effect  is uncertain  in direction  (Batabyal).
Tobey  (1989) presents both a theoretical model and empirical analysis  of the
pattern of world trade to  estimate  the  effects of domestic environmental
regulations  on trade patterns of pollution-intensive commodities.  Under several
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measures on trade patterns.  He  postulated that  the magnitude  of environmental
expenditures  in countries with stringent environmental policies are not
sufficiently large  to  cause a noticeable effect, but recognized that  the model
specification may not be sufficiently accurate  to uncover  small changes  in factor
abundances and comparative advantage.
Finally, in a dynamic  resources/trade model  (Antle and Howitt,  1988),  social
costs  from externalities associated with agricultural production activities result
in privately optimal but socially  suboptimal decisions.  Antle and Howitt consider
a country producing a commodity that degrades  a common property resource within
the country.  In a closed economy, an optimal policy involves  intervention in the
output market to restrict production to where the  marginal social benefit of
consuming  the product equals  the  marginal social cost of producing it,  including
the external cost.
In an open economy, however, all  countries could act jointly  to maximize
welfare, defined as  the  collective sum of producer and consumer surplus across
countries.  Since  the  cooperative scenario  is unlikely, each country  is assumed to
address  its  respective externality on a unilateral basis.  From a small  exporting
country's perspective, foreign consumers benefit from being  able to obtain the
exported product at  a world price that does not  include the  cost of the
externality borne by  the producing country.  Conversely, a small  importing country
is  able  to  increase  consumption of  the traded good, while  decreasing domestic
production, thus  reducing its  external costs.  Unless compensation is  forthcoming
from importing countries,  producing countries'  only options  are  to bear  the  full
costs  of externalities  or otherwise reduce  externalities by restricting production
and exports.
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In a model with internationally mobile goods,  capital and pollutants, and
where policy  instruments may be either  equipment standards  or  taxes  (Merrifield),
only the equipment standard strategy results  in an unambiguous  reduction in
pollution flows.  Attempting to  reduce pollution by imposing a new tax on the
output of polluting industries  could actually increase the pollution because
reduction  in one country's emissions may be more than offset if capital movements
increase other country's  output and emissions.  Thus,  instruments matter  in terms
of net effects  on pollution flows,  income distribution and terms  of trade.
Another lesson is  that, while an open economy does not make  it  impossible  for
either country  to  take effective unilateral action against a transnational
pollutant, each country must recognize  that some policies  could increase,  rather
than decrease, pollution flows.
In  this model, when factors are immobile across  countries and both countries
levy the  same tax on pollution, the post-tax trade equilibrium will still feature
the  same  equal factor proportions and equal  factor prices  as between countries.
The effect of coordinated  (equal) regulation on labor and capital  factor  incomes
now depends on the elasticity of demand for good X and the  relative capital/labor
intensity of X in comparison to  good Y.
However, nonuniform regulation between the countries  destroys  factor-price
equalization.  For a small  country with no influence over world commodity prices,
regulation  injures some  factor of production and benefits others.  For a large
country,  its unilateral regulation will raise  the world commodity price  of  the
regulated product.  Elsewhere in  the world, the  factor used  intensively in  the
production of regulated product will benefit.
If the  factor immobility assumption is relaxed, differential regulation will
40cause labor or capital  to  move into  or out of  the  regulated country.
Multinational companies, for example, may easily transfer capital across  borders
where nonuniform regulation provides systematic  incentives  to  relocate.  The
direction of factor migration depends on relative factor proportions  in the
regulated industry.
In a model by McGuire  (1982),  if  the pollutant  in question creates a common
international public bad and factors are mobile across national boundaries, then
unilateral  or uncoordinated regulation is  found  to be  inefficient and ultimately
ineffective.  When unilateral regulation is undertaken in these circumstances,
precisely tailored tax,  trade,  or commercial policies may compensate for the
incentive that  industry would have to  relocate  to  control-free havens.
Ultimately, however, the  leverage  that one country has  on world wide pollution
depends  on its predominance  in the  traded goods and on supply and demand
elasticities at home and abroad.
C. Models Where Traded Products Themselves  Cause Externalities
Antle and Howitt also  adapt their model to  the  "circle of poison"  issue  (p.
80).  Pesticide registration in  the U.S.  could lead to  more pesticide being
available in international factor markets at a lower price,  so  other countries
would use more.  This could offset domestic  environmental improvement.  Moreover,
pesticide  registrations  in U.S. may raise production costs,  shift excess  supply,
and raise product price in  international markets.  Production may then shift from
the U.S.  to  other parts  of world where pesticides are not restricted.  Finally,
the.U.S.  might  import more products that use restricted pesticides.
We found no  studies  on the  trade effects of regulating products whose
characteristics  are undesirable  only to consumers  in  the  importing country.  That
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pollutive products,  such as  automobiles with varying emission standards.
According to  a relatively early examination of this  issue,  the costs associated
with removing the environmentally-damaging aspects  of pollutive products may be
relatively  less distortive than process-related costs.  All products  sold by
competing domestic and foreign suppliers  in a given national market must meet the
same environmental  standards.  Hence, the environmental preferences and
assimilative capacity in an importing country  can be considered neutral with
respect to  international competitiveness,  although trade may be affected since
higher prices reduce  the  demand for both home-produced goods and imports  (Walter,
1975,  pp.  70-71).
Not all product characteristics are unambiguously negative to  all  consumers
(such as  irradiated produce).  In such cases,  trade models with differentiated
products may be appropriate.  In some models, consumers value product variety for
its own sake, while in others, variety makes goods available  that are  closer to
consumers' preferred product specifications.  The effects of trade-restricting
policies  on consumer welfare depend on model specification, substitution
relationships between foreign and domestic product varieties,  and other
assumptions  (Vousden, 1990, pp.  172-3).
D. Policy Implications
The policy implications  that can be drawn from  the above models are limited
by the  assumptions usually  imposed for tractability,  the  lack of  empirical
support,  and the  general omission of political economic factors.  Nonetheless,
their results have several  implications for EHS/trade  disputes:
1) Policy generalizations must be made with caution.  When economies are open,
changes  to  loosen or tighten domestic  EHS regulations have  indeterminate social
42welfare effects.
2) The policy instrument  (for example,  taxes versus  technology-forcing standards)
and the point of intervention in production processes  chosen to  implement
environmental, health, or safety objectives matters  in terms  of both potential
trade  and welfare effects.
3) The category of the  regulation matters  in that,  for example,  some unilateral
action may have different welfare effects with respect  to  a purely domestic EHS
problem than a transboundary EHS problem.
4) Trade effects from imposing unilateral  regulations are  indeterminate under many
plausible conditions.
5) Whether a country  is  large or small  in a trade sense may affect whether a
country gains or  loses from environmental regulation.
6) When capital  is mobile, some policy instruments  designed to  reduce
environmental damages may actually increase them globally.
7) When environmental  damages are not internalized, moving from anarchy to  trade
may lower a country's welfare.
The indeterminacy of  the  above models raises  empirical questions  that
are hard to  address  for  lack of data:
1) To what extent are commodity excess supply functions shifted by regulations
directed at production externalities?
2) Does an EHS regulation that  inhibits trade result  in a net gain or  loss  in
social welfare?
3) To what extent does an EHS regulation move the  externality compensated
comparative advantage against the exporter that implements  it  and in favor of  less
regulated competing exporters?
4) If a country is  a substantial farm product  importer as  well as  exporter, how
much would stricter controls of  chemical residues  in imported foods  internalize
the cost of input externality regulation to  the industry?  (Antle and Howitt, p.
88)
E. Political Economic Factors  in Government Behavior
Policy remedies  to  agricultural resource problems  typically involve
restrictions of production and thus  of trade.  Resource policy prescriptions will
then be  in direct conflict with the  spirit of  international trade  theory, as  well
43as policy aimed at  trade promotion.  On the other hand, protectionist policies are
likely to play the role  of second best resource policies  in the presence of
production-related externalities.
Regardless of the choice  of analytical perspective,  economic efficiency is
clearly not the only motivating force behind government behavior.  While
integrated trade/environment models provide some  insight  into the effects of
specific policy choices under assumed conditions,  they are limited in terms of
explaining current government behavior.
...[T]he  explanatory power of  trade theory, its  ability to  provide
insights  into the actions of governments,  is  tenuous  at best.  Trade
theory  is  norm oriented and within its own  frame of reference  immune
from potentially divergent results of evidence  from the  real
world...Why have governments...insisted on a great variety of trade
restrictions when...nations,  individually and collectively,  could gain
by eliminating such barriers to  trade?..[T]o better understand the
divergencies between norm and political action, it  appears fruitful  to
concentrate on...(l)  the broadening of economic policy objectives and
their effects,  independent of  the particular problems of specific
countries,  which leads  to  an analysis  of multiple and often
conflicting optimal policies  to meet a given set of targets under
specific  constraints;  and (2) the  linkages between economic and other
government policies, as well as  the development of international
economic relations as  they depend on specific power relations
(Heidhues, 1979,  p.125)
The public choice perspective can be  applied specifically to  the evolving
GATT system in which export interests generate  trade conflicts  and import
interests generate trade restrictions.  "[T]he  institutions that  shape the relevant
public  choices do not bring out  the  appropriate economic interests,  and the
resulting policy choices  are not  those that promote economic  efficiency  (Finger,
1990, p. 22)."
Political economic trade models have been developed by several authors.
Government objective functions may be modeled as  maximizing the sum of weighted
consumer, producer, and taxpayer welfare, given budget  or other constraints  (von
Witzke  and Livingston,  1990;  Johnson, Mahe,  and Roe,  1990).  While a comprehensive
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this paper  (let  alone empirical support  for any such application), we will
identify some  factors to  which government behavior appears sensitive.  One  factor
is  rent-seeking behavior by affected constituencies.  It  is  clear that choices
made  in analyzing EHS  regulations have strong distributional  implications.
Producers may band together in lobbies  to  achieve through government action what
they could not achieve  in the market.  Those groups that have a stake  in the
distributional  effects of an EHS policy have an incentive  to determine how
questions are framed for analysis, although their preferences may be expressed
implicitly.  To  the  extent that the  imposition of a given policy may have a
favorable effect with respect  to one accounting perspective, but not another, each
perspective may be preferred by a different constituent group  that competes  for
influence  in the  formation of  its  government's trade policy.
Olson  (1982)  focuses attention on the formation of special  interest groups
into coalitions  and their role  in obtaining a differential advantage  through
lobbying activities.  He  infers  that broad based coalitions tend  to  consider the
adverse macroeconomic effects  of their  lobbying efforts so  that the adverse
effects  of the differential advantage  sought are  less  than those of narrow-based
coalitions.  In contrast, narrow based coalitions  tend  to be more  interested in
the distribution of  society's  income to  their members  since resources  to expand
output have to be shared with the rest of  society, while the benefits  of the  same
resources spent on redistributing society's output  accrue entirely  to members.
According  to Olson, those  sectors most directly affected by a given regulation are
most  likely to  be effective in  lobbying the  government.  Olson's informal  theory
of government behavior is  thus  consistent with assigning greatest analytical
weight to  sectoral  effects using private values, although empirical  tests  of his
45theory are lacking  (Roe and Yelden, 1988).
Another factor affecting government behavior  is  the  transactions cost
associated with the analysis  itself.  (There are  other, non-information,
transactions costs involved in dispute resolution mechanisms).  Private  costs and
benefits  tend to be more readily estimated than social costs  and benefits  and
sectoral effects  are easier  to  calculate  than economywide effects,  the latter
requiring general equilibrium models.  Short  term effects are  easier  to project
than long term effects.
Finally, Heidhues points out that  the process  of negotiation itself gives
rise  to nonefficiency incentives.  "Trade negotiations are conducted by government
negotiators who may operate  in a frame of reference  different than that of
economic optimization...[N]othing can be conceded without counterconcessions  (p.
130)."
To  summarize, the rules  established through international negotiation to
determine  trade impacts and countermeasures are based on implicit policy weights.
The weights attached by governments reflect the balance between pressures for
efficiency and distribution, as  well as  transaction costs.  That affected
constituencies might influence  the establishment of such analytical rules  is  not
surprising, given the long history of government intervention in the  food sector.
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Political economic factors underlying the analysis  of EHS  regulations are
expressed  through various  tests  of trade  impact applied unilaterally or
multilaterally.  In the  recent history of international trade,  at  least nine
unharmonized legal and economic tests have been devised for determining whether a
domestic policy invokes  the need for some associated trade  remedy  (Hufbauer and
Erb,  1988).  Multilaterally-authorized relief has historically been based on a
relatively high threshold of trade  impact.  Furthermore, trade-impact standards
applied to  agricultural  goods have not conformed with those  applied to other goods
(Hufbauer and Erb).  This section discuses several  criteria for determining
whether an EHS regulation should invoke some countermeasure.
A. Fairness
One criterion  typically applied unilaterally is  that of fairness.  Claims of
unfairness also  call for unilateral concessions.  A country's  concept of trade
fairness  is  likely  to have origins  in its  domestic economic policy.  In the U.S.,
domestic competition tends  to be  judged fair if competitors have  advantages that
are not based on merit, such as  one-sided government assistance.  Fairness norms
reflect a country's  image of its  own virtues and are based on its perception of
normative superiority over  the country against which it  is claiming unfair trade
policies  (Hudec, 1990).
As  a trade  impact standard, fairness  suffers  from an inconsistency between
what a country considers  fair  in domestic versus international competition.  If
jobs  in  importing-competing  industries  are  lost due  to  an outside factor,  such as
lower  import prices from a competitor's  trade promotion policy,  that  is  considered
unfair.  Whereas  if  the  same jobs  are  lost from an  inside factor, such as
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Fairness claims  face two other complicating factors.  First, although the
rhetoric used in making such claims make it  sound like  fair competition requires a
state in which governments exert no  influence over markets,  the modern world has
not known such a state.
8 So  fair competition merely excludes  one-sided government
assistance.  The other complicating factor  is  that the  notion of unfairness is
asymmetric  in that it  depends on the observer's position as winner or loser
(Hudec).  "Unfortunately,  the  threshold at which the  sense of fairness  is
perceived to be violated has been lowered significantly in recent
years...(Bhagwati,  p. 732)."
B. Economic Damage
Other criteria are based on measures of economic  damage  to  a specific
producing sector.  Damages are  typically measured in terms of private export value
losses  to sectors affected by  the regulation.  Multilateral  remedies  or unilateral
retaliative measures are typically designed to  redress  the specific adverse  trade
impact.  Since claims are based on actual  damage, remedies  are formulated by
estimating the market value of the damage.  Damages criteria are based on private,
not social, values and sectoral, not economy wide effects.
For policies affecting goods not traded on international markets  (like
subsidies  for nontransportable natural resources),  this  criteria may be
particularly apposite because remedies based on claims  of economic damage do not
require a baseline of international market prices  for the resource itself.
Examples of such policies include  the Canadian government selling its  stumpage
8The U.S.  government, for example, has  long had extensive sectoral
involvement  in its  economy, with both direct and indirect  forms of export
encouragement  (Cooper).
48rights at bargain prices, U.S.  subsidies for  surface or groundwater  rights for
irrigation, and the Mexican government selling natural gas  to  domestic fertilizer
manufacturers at bargain prices  (Hufbauer and Erb).
C. Distortion
Other criteria are based on a determination of  trade distortions--whether a
country's policy  is  expected to  result in  movement towards  or  away from Pareto
Optimality within the accounting boundaries of that country.  Unlike the damages
criterion,  the distortion criterion requires  a determination regarding whether
prevailing price  signals  in the absence  of the regulation reflect social values.
A policy intended to  alter  the market price signals otherwise facing producers,
thus drawing productive resources  into  (or out of)  that sector, might be  deemed
trade-distorting  if  otherwise prevailing market prices  are accurate  guides to
social values.  For example,  a government might furnish transportable natural
resources at bargain prices, either by selling  its own rights  or by imposing price
controls  on private owners.  On the  other hand, a policy established  ostensibly to
correct one or more sources of market failure might be  deemed to be not
intentionally trade-distorting,  as  discussed in Section  III.
One practical issue regarding this  criterion  is  what benchmark to use for
the social valuation of inputs  and outputs.  International market prices are
preferable  to domestic prices,  in cases where the  two diverge.  However, world
food prices may also be misleading indicators of social value since world markets
are affected by the  sum total of many governments' interventions  in  their
agricultural sectors,  as  well as  surplus conditions  for several  commodities
(Kozloff, 1989).
A trade distortion criterion depends  on an internationally accepted
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economies might agree  to  a common definition, others may not, especially those
with previously centrally-planned or with developing economies.  It has been
suggested that GATT negotiators recognize  that countries  differ in their
viewpoints  on the  inability of markets  to price some natural resources  (Sutton,
1989).
Under this  criterion, a distortion  (for example,  a pesticide  residue
standard)  is  typically subject  to  retaliation even if  it  exerts only a slight
impact on trade  and retaliative action is  precisely designed to  offset the
implicit subsidy.  The usual remedy of imposing a countervailing duty requires
some benchmark  (such as  observed or adjusted world price) against which to  compare
the distortion, as  determined by producer or consumer subsidy equivalents or  some
other measure.  This criterion tends  to  apply a social welfare accounting
perspective  flexibly in that measures like subsidy equivalents are not able  to
incorporate distortions associated with all government policies.  EHS  regulations
also  do not  lend themselves  to  tariffication as  easily as  do other government
distortions, although the effect of environmental regulations on effective rates
of protection has been estimated (Pasurka, 1985).
D. Intent
A related criterion is  intent as  evidenced by statutory or administrative
language or other evidence gleaned from the development of the policy  (Sutton,
1989).  Mercantilist intent may be hard to  determine, especially since regulatory
bureaucracies must  interpret statutory language  to  implement policy.  Legal
language may be insufficient  to  establish intent, given that
legislative/administrative  processes of policy development may be subject.to
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establish a trade barrier)  or by domestic or  international environmental  groups
(suggesting a lack of trade barrier intention).  Also, a policy may have several
unprioritized objectives associated with it  in legal documents or  its  enabling
language may be vague.
For EHS  regulations, a possible  test of intent  is whether comparable market
failure reduction could have been achieved using an alternative policy instrument
or point  of intervention in the production process having smaller trade effects.
An example is  an environmental objective that can be met either through market
incentives or  technology-forcing standards.
A 1989 case  involving U.S.  accusations directed at Canadian regulations
restricting exports  of unprocessed salmon and herring may offer some guidance  in
determining intent.  Shortly before a hearing on a proposed retaliatory list of
Canadian products, Canada replaced its  export restrictions with a set of
conservation-based landing regulations  (Bureau of National Affairs,  1989).  In
rendering its  decision, a panel  convened under the U.S/Canada Free Trade Agreement.
used a "primarily aimed at"  test to  determine whether the measure was a genuine
environmental policy or a disguised trade barrier.  The panel also was unconvinced
that the measure, which raises production costs, would have been imposed on all
Canadian boats primarily for conservation reasons.  Finally, alternative methods
of monitoring catch rates that had smaller  trade effects were  available  (Runge,
1990a).
Even when intent  is determined, this  criterion, by itself, only  implies  the
legitimacy of the  accusation of an unfair trade barrier and  does not determine the
level  of remedial action.  An economic  remedy must  still be  pegged to some measure
of injury or distortion.
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Some  disagreements over differing EHS regulations may be precluded or
resolved based on scientific consensus criteria regarding adequate levels  of
protection of environmental or food quality and human health and safety.  Even
though an EHS  regulation that is  supported by scientific consensus distorts  trade,
it may increase national and perhaps  global  social welfare.
The use of the scientific  consensus criterion elevates  the role of
scientific experts  in trade policy.  Experts seem eager  to  assume  this  role, as
evidenced by a forthcoming meeting of the International Society of Regulatory
Toxicology and Pharmacology  "to review international regulations and to  determine
how differences  [among countries] may be managed so  that a judicious,
scientifically justifiable plan can be  adopted by all countries  (Carr and
Coulston,  1989, p.  203)."
The U.S. position on sanitary and phytosanitary regulations  in the Uruguay
round of GATT negotiations  is based heavily on "sound science."
The U.S.  has proposed that when a measure differs  from a recognized
international standard or an accepted international  standard is
lacking, the measure must be based on information or  data collected in
a  legitimate scientific manner and reflect a scientific  approach to
risk assessment.  ... The U.S. position is  that domestic standards
which are stricter  than  international standards would be  considered
justifiable on the basis  of legitimate  differences in such factors  as
dietary intake,  climatic conditions, human, animal or plant pest
profiles, and risk management....The GATT  does not and, from the U.S.
perspective, should not have the  authority to  force any country to
change  its  regulations regarding health-related trade restrictions,
provided they are based on sound science  (Foreign Agricultural
Service,  1990).
Critics argue, however,  that the  term sound science  is  a misnomer because it
implies  a consensus  (Wysham, 1990).  When there  is  scientific uncertainty,
consumers appear unwilling to  relinquish control  over food and environmental
quality to  experts  (Association for Consumer Research, 1990).  Generating
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environmental  conditions  is  easier than the  level of damages  to  producing or
consuming sectors.  It  is very difficult to  generate  scientific consensus
regarding the human health and safety effects of a given level  of pollution
reduction within a country, let alone among countries, partly due  to  the  state of
knowledge over  the often long term, subtle, and chronic effects  of human exposure
to  different substances.
F. Risk Assessment
Where  scientific consensus  on the necessity of a given regulation to protect
environmental quality or human health and safety  is not possible,  risk assessment
has been proposed.  The key characteristic of risk assessment is  its probabilistic
nature,  in that the outcome  of a risk assessment process  is  stated  in terms  of a
probability and the underlying data commonly require numerous assumptions with
associated confidence intervals  (Caswell, 1990, p. 62).
The  outcome and interpretation of a risk assessment is  highly sensitive  to
stated or unstated assumptions.  For example,  a GATT negotiating group  on
agriculture drafted language  that incorporates  effects on both consumers  and
producers  in using risk assessment to determine the appropriate  level of
protection:
Contracting parties  shall ensure  that their sanitary or
phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to
the circumstances,  of the  risks  to human, animal,  or plant life or
health, taking into account risk assessment techniques  developed by
the relevant international organizations.
...In the  assessment of risks, contracting parties shall  take
into account available  scientific evidence;  relevant processes  and
production methods;  relevant  inspection, sampling, and testing
methods;  prevalence  of specific diseases  or pests;  ecological and
environmental conditions;  and quarantine or other treatment.
...In assessing the risk and determining  the appropriate level
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, contracting parties  shall
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terms of loss  of production or  sales  in the event of the establishment
or  spread of a pest or disease,  the costs of control  or eradication in
the importing contracting party, and relative cost effectiveness of
alternative approaches to  limiting risks  (Negotiating Group on
Agriculture,  1990, p. 5).
As a policy tool applied in resolving EHS/trade disputes  (and
environmental/economic  conflicts  in general),  risk assessment has been subject to
at least three criticisms.  First, risk assessments relating to human health are
typically conducted on the basis of a single population.  However,  there are both
intra- and international differences  in human susceptibility to  substances  in
food.
Actual usage and therefore intake will vary from country to country
and among special  groups within countries, according to  dietary
habits,  the climate and quality of temperature  controls  (influencing
use of preservatives),  the characteristics of traditional products,
and so  on...The  nutritional status of people  is also  relevant:
malnourished people may be  at greater risk from a potential hazard
than those  in good health  (Association for Consumer Research,  5.3.1).
Second, the quantitative level of risk  that  is  perceived to be  acceptable by
consumers is based on many factors other  than risk assessment.  The  demand for
protection standards  is driven by perceived risk, not quantitative risk
assessment.  The discrepancy between perceived risk and "objective"  risk
assessment can be partly resolved by appealing to  consumers'  relative lack of
information about relevant probabilities.  Consumers, however,  demonstrate
concerns  about  a broader  range of risk characteristics  than can be captured in
risk assessment  (Caswell;  Zeckhauser and Viscusi, 1990;  Senauer, 1989).  One
study, for example,  found that providing public information about the  risks of
nuclear power did not result in convergence of public perception and expert
judgement about the  risks  involved (Liu and Smith, 1991).  Smith  (1989) concludes
that existing models  of individual  response to  environmental risks  are inadequate.
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terms of what constitutes acceptable risk, but also  the concept of risk itself.
For example,  there  is no word for risk  in Japanese  (Vogel).  Cultural endowments
may give  rise  to  revealed preferences among a country's population for safety-
related qualitative characteristics  of food products that  are not differentiated
in international market transactions.  Since perceptions  and attitudes  toward risk
are  shaped by heterogenous  cultural endowments,  "...different societies can--quite
legitimately--reach different decisions about  the levels  of risk they are prepared
to  carry  (Association for Consumer Research,  5.5.3)."
G. Social and Economic Need
In contrast to  scientific consensus,  social and economic need criteria have
been proposed for  the approval of new technologies that may have  international
trade effects.  The EC  is  considering this  for judging approval of production-
enhancing  substances,  including hormones, antibiotics, and other products.  If
accepted, the criterion would subject technological innovations  to a
"nonobjective"  test in addition to  international criteria of  safety, quality,  and
efficacy  (Kelch and Raney, 1989,  p. 36).  In the case  of BST, EC  officials fear
that  its widespread used could exacerbate the surplus of dairy products and force
smaller producers  out of business.  Applying this  criterion to bovine  growth
hormones has generated fears among producers that virtually any technological
innovation could be  banned, since most are designed to  enhance yields or reduce
costs.  According to  a legal  analysis, socioeconomic concerns  are not relevant  in
determining whether a ban violates  the GATT standards  code  (Rothberg).  The
criterion, however, is  supported by some  consumer interests  (Ritchie; Association
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In terms  of developing trade  impact  tests  and remedies, there  appears  to be
a conceptual  inconsistency between the  scientific  consensus and socioeconomic need
approaches to  test whether a domestic  EHS regulation  is  "fair".  This
inconsistency  is analogous  to  determining whether,  for example,  economic damages
from water pollution are based on human perception or  scientific measurement of
water quality.  The inconsistency raises  the further question how to appropriately
value countermeasures once unfairness is  determined, that  is,  whether valuation
should be based on the primacy of consumer revealed tastes and preferences or
physical science  data.
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The  above  tests of trade  impact, by themselves,  do not constitute mechanisms
for resolving EHS/trade disputes.  They need to  be placed in some procedural
context.  Policy issues  that must be addressed relate  to burden of proof,
unilateral vs. multilateral  action, and institutional  reform versus creation of
new institutional structures.  In this  section, we evaluate  some  existing
institutions that might  serve as models for EHS/trade dispute resolution
mechanisms.
A.  Harmonization
Under the umbrella of multilateral mechanisms  for institutional reform, one
of the most commonly discussed means  of minimizing  future EHS/trade disputes  is
international harmonization, which is  to make  EHS regulations  the  same across
countries.  Like other concepts  discussed in this paper, harmonization means
different things when applied to different EHS/trade contexts.  One broad
distinction is between harmonization of physical standards us  opposed to
principles  that govern who shall bear the costs of achieving EHS regulations.
With respect  to  the former, harmonization as a principle needs  to be further
specified with respect to how it  is  to be  applied to  specific EHS  regulations.
EHS  standards may be cast  in terms  of ambient standards specifying permissible
levels  of pollution in ambient media, emission and effluent standards,
environmentally-related product  standards, and exposure standards.  Depending on
which is  targeted, harmonization may have very different effects  on trade  and
national welfare.
The major question usually associated with harmonization is  the  level of
strictness of the harmonized standard, as  in recent EC unification discussions:
57It is  likely that the  EC  will harmonize standards  at strict levels,
but not at  the level of the member state with  the strictest level.
Relatively strict tolerance  levels  for pesticide  and herbicide
residues  are  in effect in northern tier countries while more lenient
tolerances  are  in effect for southern tier countries, because  southern
agroclimatic conditions  require more  extensive use of pesticides  and
herbicides  (Kelch and Raney, 1990,  p. 29).
In other words, strict compliance with a harmonized standard would impose greater
production costs  on southern tier than northern tier  countries.
Perhaps  the strongest economic argument that can be made  for international
harmonization relates  to  environmentally-related product standards  for
internationally traded goods:
Uniform product standards reduce  the cost of adapting products  to
different markets, allowing longer production runs at  a lower unit
cost.  Uniform product standards  (and testing procedures)...are easier
to establish when scientific opinions on a health hazard are
uncontroversial  and when the  costs of adapting products  to  separate
markets are high (Pearson, 1987,  p. 116)
Based on this argument, internationally uniform product standards would appear
more workable  for those product attributes that can be controlled through design
or  input choice  in homogeneous production processes than, for example, pesticide
residue standards for food products.
Besides what  to harmonize, where to peg harmonized standards, and who will
do  it,  is  the question of the conditions under which harmonization leads  to  an
internationally  efficient allocation of resources.  Harmonization of product
standards may lead to  a divergence  rather than a convergence of marginal social
benefits and  costs across  countries demonstrating different preferences  for
product  attributes.  The most extreme version of product harmonization is  an
outright ban.  This  is  exactly what occurred in  the beef hormone  dispute between
the U.S.  and EC.  The ban could have been limited to  those  countries concerned
with food hormones  as a safety issue, but because  of the  need to harmonize,  the
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While harmonization of environmental standards  in production processes
appears  to promote fairness  and may also  result in greater trade  flows  than in  its
absence,  it does not neutralize the  trade effects  of differential national
environmental endowments.  A given level of environmental quality may be  achieved
at very different cost in different countries.  Internationally uniform emission
or  ambient standards would not harmonize environmental control costs  and
competitive positions  internationally even if that were a desirable objective.
Also,  the  policy instruments used to  achieve roughly homogeneous  standards may be
very different.9 Moreover, social benefits  associated with ambient standard
depend upon extent and vulnerability of receptors and values attached to
environmental  services.  A major shortcoming of strict harmonization is  thus  the
lack of recognition of heterogeneity in environmental endowments.
B. Equivalency
As  a response to  criticisms  of strict harmonization, "equivalency" has been
proposed as  a related concept  that enables  two countries'  regulations to  have the
same  degree of EHS protection, but be quantitatively different:
The principle of equivalency is  an integral part of the U.S.
position concerning the harmonization of national regulations.  This
principle allows  for the  recognition of different circumstances under
which countries protect their plant, animal, and human health.  In the
U.S. view, the test of whether a standard is  acceptable under  the
strengthened GATT rules would be  if it  provides an equivalent
guarantee of health protection, not whether  it  is  identical  to  a
national or the  international standard.  Thus,  international
9 In a cross-country  study of pollution regulations  (Kopp et al.,  1990), the authors found it  difficult to make apples-to-apples comparisons across
countries.  To  the extent that comparisons could be made, they found
regulations  to be similar with larger differences  in implementation
strategies.
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climate, soil,  dietary patterns, and other  factors  to  be accounted  for
in justifying the  scientific basis for a national regulation (Grueff
and Bylenga, 1989, p. 39).
An EC proposal also accepts principles of  equivalency and Japan has  argued for
allowances  for the differences  in sanitary conditions,  geographic conditions,  and
dietary customs  (Kelch and Raney 1990, p. 31).10
Implementation of the  equivalency principle would require  some procedure
either for determining equivalency within GATT rules or  for settling disputes
arising over equivalency.  The former would allow uniform application, but would
impose major rulemaking requirements.  Under the  latter, GATT would become
involved only when equivalency of national regulations  is  called into  question
(Hillman, p. 128).
It remains  to be  seen whether equivalency offers real advantages over
harmonization as  a mechanism to mitigate EHS/trade disputes.  The  test of
"equivalent guarantee of protection" could be  applied differently by different
countries.  For example,  suppose two countries  impose  soil erosion standards of 5
and 10  tons per acre per year, respectively, each of which restricts  soil loss  to
one half its natural  replacement rate.  The  standards are  interpreted by one
country as  not strictly harmonized but equivalent.  Actual damages from future
10  The proposed principle of mutual recognition retreats further  from
harmonization than the concept of equivalence.
... Where harmonization is  not needed or  cannot be reached, the
principle of mutual recognition of national regulations and
standards will be  invoked.  Mutual recognition means that each EC
member country will accept the standards of other members as
equivalent  to  their own.  This  strategy is  fundamental to  the
success  of the harmonization process, because  it means that any
product legally manufactured in one EC  country will have access  to
all other member states' markets  (Kelch and Raney, 1990, p. 29).
The  looming threat of reciprocal  recognition of varying national regulations
may  induce EC member states to  agree  on harmonized rules  for most food and
agricultural products before  the  borders  fall in 1992.
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leading the  other country to  claim that the erosion standards are not even
equivalent.
Similar problems  could arise  over testing  the equivalency of regulations
effecting human health.  In  the food sector, there  is both natural and cultural
variation among populations  in health responses  to  food components and
contaminants.  Applications of  the equivalency principle could become mired in
questions over  the legitimacy of cultural preferences and tastes as  a basis for
differing national  regulations.
The equivalency principle also exposes a possible conflict between the  goals
of trade and environmental protection.  Welfare gains  from trade arise when factor
endowments differ among countries  and determine specialization  in production.
Factor endowments  that determine a country's comparative advantage include both
natural  endowments, such as  the  environment's assimilative capacity, and social
and political endowments, such as  the regulatory environment.  Both types of
endowments  can affect production costs.
Under strict harmonization of an environmental regulation, differences  in
environmental  endowments are likely  to be reflected in differing production costs,
preserving comparative advantage.  In contrast, equivalency might allow a
difference in environmental endowments  to be offset by less strict regulation,
justified by the claim of equivalent protection.  The  resulting difference in
production costs  would be less  than under harmonization, resulting in  foregone
gains  from trade.
Thus,  the test of what constitutes  a legitimate  EHS regulation versus
disguised trade barrier may simply be replaced by  the question of what constitutes
a legitimate national endowment.  Taken to  an extreme,  allowing differing
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equivalency could obviate the comparative advantage rationale for gains  from
trade.
C.  Polluter Pays  Principle
While the  equivalency principle recognizes differences  in national
endowments,  it still  requires  that EHS  objectives be  the same, even though demand
for environmental or  food quality varies  across countries.  Thus, some  observers
have called for harmonization of the principles that govern who shall bear the
costs  of achieving EHS  objectives.  In one country, a polluter may pass such costs
on to  customers while,  in another country, the  government may assume  part or all
of such costs.
The  EC's adoption of the  "polluter pays principle"  (PPP) is a step toward
international harmonization of such cost principles. 1l Given the  same global
environmental  quality result,  there  is  potential for a social welfare  improvement
under PPP relative to  physical harmonization (for  the  same reason that domestic
pollution taxes have potential  for social welfare  improvement over quantitative
emission standards).
Different EHS policy instruments may be compared with respect to  their
relative trade neutrality.  According  to  theory, only the PPP  is  trade neutral;
departures have trade effects.  A major criticism of the PPP  is  that  its
implementation  requires extensive data, not only on measures of pollution, but
also  on environmental  control costs across  countries.
Another criticism of the  PPP is  that  its distributional  implications are
1l  The  term  "principle"  as  used here means  that the  PPP is  a goal  that EC
members have,  so  far, honored more in the breach.
62ambiguous because  it  is path dependent.  Any prescription depends on the initial
endowments in place as  the  starting point for analysis.  Because the PPP  is  not
time neutral  (outcomes depend on whether or not pollution has already occurred),
it tends  to  support  the status quo  (Livingston and von Witzke,  1988,  p. 15).
According to Pearson, a principle that  is preferable  to  the PPP  is  to
establish ambient environmental quality standards on the basis  of a local calculus
of costs and benefits, and to  support  these with effluent and emission standards
on individual sources  in a least-cost fashion.  However,  this  is  at  least as  hard
to  translate into policy as  the  PPP because  of extensive information requirements.
In addition,  it  is not applicable to  transboundary pollution, in which case
benefit/cost analysis conducted at  the national  level  is  too narrow.
D.  Information-Based Institutional Mechanisms
Many domestic EHS  regulations are justified on the basis of  lack of
information available to  the importing country on qualitative characteristics
(Sankey, 1989).  This  is  a special problem for developing countries with goods
that may pose EHS concerns.  Institutional mechanisms that have been proposed to
address  these  concerns  include testing, certification, labeling and other
approaches based on providing information either to  the  importing country or to
the final user.
Five developing nations recently proposed creation of a working group  to
GATT to control the export of domestically prohibited products.  The nation's
proposed that when prohibiting the  sale of  any product on domestic products,
countries  should also consider prohibiting exports.  It was suggested that export
be permitted only after relevant authorities in the importing country had already
given "prior  informed consent (Sankey, p. 101)."
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Information on Chemicals  in International Trade.  The Guidelines provide that
signatories notify each other whenever a chemical  is  restricted, so  that  other can
assess  risks and take necessary  action.  At the request  of an importing country,
the exporting country is  required to provide  information as  to why a chemical  is
banned  (Sankey, p. 104).
Even when multilateral information-based institutional mechanisms  are
adhered to,  domestic institutions are often not sufficient to  ensure  that the
information reaches  the  final user.  Local officials may be bribed;  different
languages may be used on warning labels;  and chemicals may be remixed after being
imported.
International  rules  also relate to  who bears the burden of providing
information to product consumers.  According to  an EC position, if the health or
safety risk occurs  at the  point of production, the producing country would have
the right  and responsibility to  regulate  it.  Whereas  if the  risk occurs at  the
point of consumption, the consuming country would have  the right and
responsibility  to test and certify the product's safety  (Kelch and Raney, 1990, p.
31).
Labeling in  the context  of the GATT Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreement has
been criticized as  an inadequate substitute for direct controls over foodstuffs.
Criticisms of heavy reliance on labeling for consumer protection include:  children
and many adults cannot read labels,  information is  limited when several  languages
are used, some  foods are not easily labeled, and labels can be misleading
(Association for Consumer Research).
64E.  Legal  Issues
Regardless  of whether physical standards  or cost allocation is  the basis for
harmonization, there  is  the question of which party bears  the burden of proof
regarding deviations from the norm.  The  question of burden of proof is  important
since  it  implies an initial state with respect  to  the  international allocation of
property rights.  A recent U.S. position on the  issue  is  as  follows:
In cases where  domestic standards  differ from recognized international
standards,  the U.S. believes  that it  should be up  to  the  importing
country to demonstrate the scientific  foundation of its  own standard.
In cases where  the equivalency of a measure is  under question, the
burden of proof would fall on the  exporter  (Foreign Agricultural
Service, 1990, p. 3).
Because burden of proof requirements  impose heavy  information and legal costs on a
country, the determination of burden of proof may be  as hotly contested as  an EHS
standard itself.  According to a recent legal note on the GATT standards code, re-
allocating  the burden of proof  is warranted.  Both U.S.  and EC case  law assign the
burden of proof to  the regulating nation.  The Code, however, assigns  the burden
to the non-regulating party who must always prove a negative,  that is,
conclusively demonstrate that consumption of a particular food stuff poses
absolutely no health risk to  the  consuming nation  (Rothberg).  A similar
argument, however, can be made for a regulating party who must prove  that an EHS
regulation poses no potential adverse  trade effect.  In the  case  of the Danish law
requiring returnable beverage containers,  the burden was on Denmark to prove  that
its measures were  "not disproportionate  to  achieve  a legitimate aim."  This burden
was not satisfied, even though the  European Court found that a recycling regime
would not achieve  the  same  standard of resource  conservation and that exemptions
were  available for  small distributors and test marketers  (Shrybman, p. 26).
Another  legal issue  affecting resolution of EHS/trade disputes  is  the
mechanism for internal compliance.  Regardless of whether harmonization or
65equivalency  is chosen, trade representatives must be able  to  "deliver the  goods"
in terms of  securing their respective countries'  compliance with trade agreements.
While an international standard may influence national legislation,  it  achieves
actual  efficacy only after its  integration in the  domestic legislation of a
country under some juridical form.  The acceptance  of an international standard by
a signatory and the  integration of the  same standard within the  state's  internal
law must be distinguished.  The  integration of a standard requires  a previous
legislative instrument which makes the standard mandatory, the  form of which
depends on the constitutional rules  in force.  These vary from country to  country
(Delville, 1978;  Gerard, 1978).
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A. Policy Recommendations
Our recommendations are offered with consideration  to both the processes and
the outcomes of EHS/trade disputes, maintaining a balance between countries'
domestic EHS  and international trade policy objectives, and the unlikelihood that
highly specific prescriptions will apply to  all cases discussed  in this paper.
1) Select domestic policy instruments to  implement EHS regulations  that are as
"trade neutral"  as  possible,  given that strict  trade neutrality is  realistically
unattainable.
To  implement this recommendation first requires  that national governments
analyze  the various policy instruments available  (given prevailing property rights
allocations) and alternative points of intervention in production processes.
Governments would then address domestic sources of market failure  as close to  the
source  of the failure as  possible, rather  than through trade policy  instruments.
Market-incentive  type policy instruments over command and control  instruments that
are more likely to  act  as  trade barriers.
Lack of information about  a food product could be reduced by testing,
certification, and/or labeling.  In some cases,  it may suffice  to  require  label
information about food quality or origin for both domestic  and imported products.
In extreme cases,  instituting a ban on an imported food product may be
unavoidable.
2) Where multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms already exist, implement
reforms  to  enhance their  effectiveness without compromising national sovereignty.
There are  incremental  improvements that could be  made to  specific
mechanisms,  such as  with Standards  Code.  Two reforms may help.  First, interested
parties  should be prohibited from voting in dispute settlement procedures.
Second, jurisdictional issues  should be  clarified to  prevent countries from
67skirting code obligations through artful legislative drafting  (Dick).
To  contain fairness claims, Hudec  (1990) has  three  suggestions:
A) Seek to  disprove  the  normative validity of claims.  The problem  is  that
it  is hard to prove  that a level  playing field exists.
B) Remove advantages  that cause unfairness claims such as  trade barriers.
The problem is  that  there are numerous  differences  among national economies, so
harmonization is  difficult.
C) Conduct a series of negotiated limitations based on avoidance of mutual
destruction.  Other governments  can use  same fairness  concepts  against one's own
exports  thus harming one's own exporters who then become an offsetting political
force.  Limits  on fairness legislation should thus  appear when losses  to  exporters
are greater than gains  to  local producers.  The  success of this  approach for the
U.S. depends  on other governments actually applying U.S.  fairness  concepts to  U.S.
exports.  The power  imbalance among trading nations, however, may thwart this
occurrence.
3) In reforming multilateral institutions,  increase  opportunities for public
information and participation, especially among those interest  groups concerned
about social welfare effects not reflected in market transactions.
With respect  to both harmonization and dispute resolution processes, there
are several reforms  that may reduce  transactions costs associated with public
resistance  in the long run, although transactions  costs may be  increased in the
short run.  In general,  such processes  should be made more democratic and
transparent in the sense  of providing more public information about them and
opening up participation on technical committees  to  a wide range  of (nonindustry)
groups.  The requirement  that trade  agreements be voted up  or down in Congress as
a complete package  tends  to  discourage public debate unless there  is  ample
opportunity  for debate  to have occurred prior to  the agreement being  reached.
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public hearings  in advance  of developing the U.S. negotiating position.
With respect to Codex,  standard-setting procedures  could be opened for
fuller public participation.  In particular,  there could be requirements  for
consumer representation on technical  expert and advisory committees  (Association
for Consumer Research).
Given the perception that international harmonization negotiations with
potential  EHS  impacts are being made away from public scrutiny, such negotiations
could also be made  subject to  open meeting and full  freedom of information
requirements  (Association for Consumer Research).
Another way to  enhance public participation  is by establishing  less  formal
communication opportunities between experts and nonexperts.  For example, Dutch
authorities  are developing a scheme  for assessing biotechnology that  involves
gathering data on risks  from experts and opinions  from affected groups.  A
dialogue is  then  set up between consumers  and other groups having an interest  in
the issue  (Association for Consumer Research).  Opposing views, of course, will
not necessarily converge as  a result of this  process.
4) In developing new multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms,  seek
institutional models that are  appropriate to  the various categories of EHS/trade disputes.
In Section V, we distinguished several  categories of domestic EHS
regulations with respect  to  their effects  on international trade.  Because
different EHS regulations have qualitatively different  trade and welfare effects,
countries have varying incentives  to preclude or resolve EHS/trade disputes
multilaterally or noncooperatively.  Each category of EHS  regulation may require a
different  institutional framework for multilateral cooperation.
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adoption of  a recognized system of  "green" product symbols may be  appropriate.
Some transnational pollution issues  may be amenable to  institutions modeled after
the Montreal  Protocol regarding chlorofluorocarbon emissions  (Runge, 1990b).
However, traded consumer products that pose health concerns  or purely domestic
environmental  externalities may require other models.  For example,  differing
domestic environmental regulation might be  subjected to  environmental  audits
(similar to human rights audits)  conducted by a neutral third party  (Sand, 1990).
The point  is  that differing national incentives  to  agree to  multilateral
approaches must be considered in designing such approaches  in order for
cooperation to  occur.12
5) In cases where a national EHS  regulation deviates  from an internationally
harmonized standard, seek resolution processes that balance trade  and welfare
interests.
Because  trade and welfare may be affected in opposite ways by a given
resolution of an EHS/trade dispute, national governments face political  trade-offs
in terms  of domestic distributional and efficiency implications  of the resolution..
One way for dispute resolution mechanisms to  allow national governments to  balance
trade and welfare  objectives  is by explicitly recognizing national  differences in
environmental endowments and consumer tastes and preferences, including cultural
differences in the concept  of risk.  National differences could also be considered
in assigning burden of proof requirements for unfair trade practice accusations.
To balance national sovereignty and trade concerns,  the burden of proof could
perhaps be assigned as  follows:  If the  EHS standard is  stricter than the
12Multilateralism, however, is not an end  in itself.  A recent
theoretical  inquiry found that  international cooperation on environmental
protection tends  to be  easier to  achieve when the gains  from cooperation over
unilateral measures  are relatively small, and vice versa (Barrett, 1991).
70international norm, the burden is  assigned to those who want to weaken it.  If the
standard is  less  strict than the international norm, the burden is  assigned to  the
country  that promulgated  it.  This  system may deter  countries  from undervaluing
their  environmental endowments which would otherwise  cause a general lowering of
environmental  standards.
In addition, EHS concerns  could be  incorporated ex ante  into  international
trade decisionmaking by (1) requiring environmental, health, or  safety assessments
of proposed trade-related actions and  (2) amending international trade agreements
to  recognize the legitimacy of national  laws aimed at environmental protection,
not just human, animal, or plant health (Christensen, 1990).
B. Summary
While  the political atmosphere  over EHS/trade disputes  focuses on trade
effects,  theoretical models  indicate that trade and social welfare  effects of  EHS
regulations may diverge.  When economies are  open, relaxing or tightening EHS
regulations have indeterminate net social welfare effects  under many plausible
conditions  in  integrated environment/trade models.  Policy instruments  and points
of intervention matter in terms  of both  trade and welfare effects.  Observed
government behavior  in trade negotiation, however,  is not consistent with welfare
maximization in most  theoretical models.
National or  subnational EHS  regulations can be categorized in terms  of how
they affect international trade.  The distinctions are  relevant to determining
appropriate tests of trade  impact and remedies.  Conversely, international trade
can affect environmental  quality and human health and safety through several
pathways,  some of which flow  from scale economies  and specialization  afforded by
trade.  Because of this potential  for two-way causality, the  social welfare
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analysis.
Different producer or consumer  groups  involved in an EHS/trade dispute have
incentives  to  frame  analysis of the dispute  in ways  favorable to  their interests.
In particular, distributional and efficiency effects  tend to become blurred by
charges  and countercharges.  The analytical perspectives  that underlie  the charges
(private versus social values,  states  of the world compared, bounds of system
being analyzed) are rarely articulated explicitly.
The legitimacy of a national EHS  regulation, from  the perspective of
warranting actions  to  remedy adverse international trade  impacts,  is difficult to
determine.  A variety of economic and legal  tests have been used with varying
success.  While the presence of market failure appears  to be at  least a necessary
condition  for legitimacy, there  is  not international agreement over what
conditions constitute market failure.  Countries vary in their  initial prevailing
property rights  assignments, political environments  that determine what policy
instruments are  acceptable, and nonefficiency objectives  associated with EHS
regulations.
Even if an EHS  regulation has  the effect of reducing some  source of market
failure,  it may still  fail some test of trade impact.  Tests that have been
applied unilaterally or multilaterally use criteria based on fairness, economic
damage, distortion, and intent.  Whether a regulation is  too strict or lax has
been tested according to  criteria based on scientific consensus, risk
considerations,  and social  and distributional effects.  Unless there  is  agreement
on tests of  trade impact,  it seems unlikely that  institutional mechanisms  such as
harmonization or equivalency will be successful.
72C. Prognosis
While  the above  recommendations may provide guidance  for more  specific
improvements in EHS/trade dispute resolution mechanisms,  our  summary suggests  that
the near term potential for  substantially reducing the severity or number of such
disputes is not high.  There are  several reasons  for this.  One  is  that the sheer
volume of international trade is  growing with increased potential  for conflict
between those domestic  constituencies supporting protection of environmental
quality, health, and safety and those advocating more liberalized trade.  At an
analytical  level, this  can be  expressed as  an inconsistency in accounting
perspectives--what are considered costs  and benefits--that  are used to justify
decisions  in each policy arena.  While national representatives  are not likely to
be maximizing global Pareto Opimality in international  trade negotiations,
whatever balance  they seek between EHS and trade objectives is  rarely explicitly
articulated.  Second, the understanding of causal  linkages between trade and
environment  (while much progress has been made)  is  still  limited by relatively
simple models and lack of empirical  support.  Third, most tests  of trade  impact
that form the basis  for countermeasures either impose heavy  information
requirements or provide insufficient guidance to  international adjudicatory
bodies.  Finally, while disputes  themselves  increase the transactions costs  of
trade because of delay, so may remedial  institutional mechanisms.  For example,
harmonization, regardless of what form it  takes,  requires costly information to be
assembled on physical and/or economic effects  of alternative regulations.
Given that  the potential for adverse  trade effects  from EHS regulations may
be comparable  in magnitude to  other non-tariff barriers,  this prognosis  from a
purely trade perspective may seem bleak.  It must be remembered, however, that
international  trade  is merely a means, not an end.  Any given resolution  to an
73EHS/trade dispute has national and global welfare effects  that potentially diverge
-in direction from trade effects.  The  implication of this  is  to perhaps  lessen the
level of concern over  the effects  of EHS regulations  on trade.
Much of  the policy debate  over EHS/trade  disputes has been obfuscated by
failure  to disentangle  trade from welfare effects.  The goal  of designing improved
tests of  trade impact and dispute resolution mechanisms  should not necessarily be
to pre-empt such disputes.  If net social welfare maximization  is  the overarching
goal,  then it can be promoted by a balancing of trade and EHS objectives that may
only be possible  through the dispute resolution process  itself.  Rather than
seeking to  prevent disputes,  the policy goal should be to  resolve  those that arise
in a manner that maximizes social welfare, subject  to distributional  and
transactions costs  constraints.
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